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WHY INTERNATIONAL CATCH
SHARES WON’T SAVE OCEAN
BIODIVERSITY
Holly Doremus*
Skepticism about the efficacy and efficiency of regulatory approaches has produced
a wave of enthusiasm for market-based strategies for dealing with environmental
conflicts. In the fisheries context, the most prominent of these strategies is the use
of “catch shares,” which assign specific proportions of the total allowable catch to
individuals who are then free to trade them with others. Catch shares are now in
wide use domestically within many nations, and there are increasing calls for
implementation of internationally tradable catch shares. Based on a review of
theory, empirical evidence, and two contexts in which catch shares have been
proposed, this Article explains why international catch shares are not likely to
arrest the decline of ocean biodiversity. Catch shares were developed to promote
greater economic efficiency and profitability in the fishing industry. They have
proven capable of doing so at the domestic level, although their effects on wealth
distribution have frequently been controversial. Theoretical and empirical
support for the proposition that catch shares promote conservation, especially of
non-target resources, is thinner. Furthermore, in the international context catch
shares face special challenges. Catch shares cannot resolve the value differences
that underlie the most intractable disagreements about international fisheries
management. They are less likely to reduce conflicts over total allowable catch in
the international than in the domestic context, because distrust of managers and
competitors runs deeper. Finally, catch share strategies require effective enforcement, which is both institutionally and practically difficult to provide for many
international fisheries. In general, catch shares are not a promising route to
improving international fisheries management, and pursuing them could distract
the international community from more important steps toward improving
conservation of global ocean resources.
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INTRODUCTION
There is currently a great deal of enthusiasm, in both the domestic and
the international contexts, for property rights-based approaches to fishery
management. Such approaches, most commonly in the form of “catch
shares,” or individually allocated portions of the total allowable catch
(TAC), have been adopted in a number of nations for fisheries covering a
number of stocks. Although there are not yet any international catch share
fisheries, recent proposals suggest a move in that direction may be inevitable.
In this Article, I evaluate international catch share strategies as conservation tools and find them wanting. Catch shares have had positive economic
effects in a range of domestic fisheries, but are not necessarily useful for
addressing ecological problems. They may reduce conflict over total allowable
catch levels, but only if the participants have a long time horizon and believe
catch restrictions are necessary. At the same time, catch share programs
enhance conflicts over the allocation of rights, which are commonly a major
barrier to international fishery agreements. Finally, property rights-based
fisheries management requires committed and effective enforcement institutions, which are notably lacking in many global fisheries.
A closer look at two contexts in which tradable property rights have
been proposed—to govern the harvest of whales and bluefin tuna—shows
that such proposals would face high political and practical hurdles, without
offering much added conservation value. While many international fisheries
clearly need better management and frustration with current regulatory
approaches is understandable, introducing catch shares should not be the
first priority. The effort to make a catch share strategy work could unproductively distract from addressing more important needs.
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I. FROM COMMONS TO CATCH SHARES
Fisheries present a classic tragedy of the commons.1 Traditionally,
national and international law protected rights of open access; the freedom
of anyone who wanted to do so to participate in fisheries was fiercely
guarded. That was not a problem when pressure on ocean resources was
limited. At that point, the seas were effectively inexhaustible relative to the
ability and desire of human beings to exploit them. But as demand for fish
and the sophistication of fishing technologies increased, the tradition of
open access became problematic both for fishermen and for their targets.
Put most simply, the problem was (and is) that too many boats were
chasing too few fish. From the fisherman’s perspective, that meant that the
economic rents of resource exploitation were lost, or to put it in less
abstract terms, that profits were elusive. With essentially no barriers to
entry, fishery participants dissipated a greater and greater share of revenues
in an unwinnable arms race, adding vessels and equipment so that they
might capture fish before their competitors could do so. The costs of fishing
rose until the industry was barely profitable.2 Not only were incomes kept
low, risks to life and limb were kept high. Commercial fishing, always a
dangerous occupation, became even more so as fishermen sought to maximize
their share of the catch.
From a conservation perspective, traditional open access fishing was
equally problematic. Fishermen had no incentive to leave fish in the ocean,
where they would be available to the first comer. Sustainable harvest might
be to the benefit of the entire industry, but participants who were unable to
restrain the behavior of their competitors would be foolish to restrain themselves. The economically rational behavior was a mad scramble in which
everyone sought to grab as much fish as they could in the short run, without
regard to long-term effects on the resource. The predictable outcome was
“fishing down food webs.”3 The easiest and most lucrative targets were
fished out to the point where chasing them no longer made economic sense.
Then the industry moved on to the next target, and the next.

1.
Garrett Hardin is famous for coining this phrase. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). But the idea had been articulated in the fisheries
context years earlier. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource:
The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 134–35 (1954).
2.
Indeed, the industry may operate at a deficit. One report several years ago pegged
annual costs at $124 billion, compared to harvest value of only $70 billion. Carrie Tipton,
Note, Protecting Tomorrow's Harvest: Developing a National System of Individual Transferable
Quotas to Conserve Ocean Resources, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381, 390 (1995).
3.
Daniel Pauly et al., Fishing Down Marine Food Webs, 279 SCIENCE 860 (1998).
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This uncontrolled fish chase threatened entire marine ecosystems, not
just target species. If harvests could be increased or speeded up by the use
of bottom trawls4 or enormous drift nets,5 it was entirely rational for
fishermen locked in competition with one another to adopt those methods.
By-catch and incidental effects on non-target species were unintended but
apparently unavoidable consequences of the race to capture the resource. As
in other contexts, the combination of two legal rules—(1) that the resources
of the ocean were unowned until reduced to possession; and (2) that anyone
could pursue those resources—inevitably encouraged waste and overexploitation.
By the 1950s, economists had noted the consequences of the inefficient
and destructive race for fish, and suggested that private property rights
might hold solutions.6 In the short run, however, those insights had little
practical consequence for ocean fisheries. Prevailing circumstances made
privatization seem both unnecessary and impractical. The resources of the
seas were still widely viewed as inexhaustible; although landings in some
4.
The Natural Resources Defense Council has compared bottom trawling to landbased strip mining: “Bottom trawlers drag giant weighted nets along the ocean floor, ripping
up or scooping out whatever they encounter, including ancient coral forests, gardens of
anemones and entire fields of sea sponges . . . . Trawling nets, huge weighted bags, can be
200 feet wide and 40 feet high, weigh as much as 1,000 pounds, and can be sunk to depths of
5,000 feet or more beneath the water's surface. Heavier, stronger gear allows trawl nets to
plow over rocky bottoms, destroying the underwater corals, sponges and rock structures that
provide important habitat for fish.” Protecting Ocean Habitat from Bottom Trawling, NATURAL
RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Feb. 1, 2007), http://www.nrdc.org/water/oceans/ftrawling.asp.
Although most of it occurs in very deep waters, the sediment plumes stirred up by bottom
trawling reach the surface, where they can be seen from space. Bottom Trawling Impacts on
Ocean, Clearly Visible from Space, SCI. DAILY (Feb. 20, 2008), http://www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2008/02/080215121207.htm. In addition to destroying seafloor habitat, bottom
trawls “catch everything in their path, including endangered sea turtles, juvenile fish and
other unwanted species.” MONTEREY BAY AQUARIUM, FISHING METHODS FACT CARD,
available at http://www.montereybayaquarium.org/cr/cr_seafoodwatch/content/media/MBA_
SeafoodWatch_TrapsandPots&TrawlingFactCards.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
5.
Drift nets are enormous fine mesh panels hung vertically in the ocean. They are
non-selective, designed to catch or entangle whatever swims into them. They have been used
for centuries, but have long been a source of conflict both because they are capable of so
efficiently killing their target species and because they also kill large numbers of non-target
fish, birds, and marine mammals. See Stuart Sugarman, The Failure to Achieve a High Seas
Driftnet Ban, 3 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 5 (1992); SIMON P. NORTHRIDGE, DRIFTNET
FISHERIES AND THEIR IMPACTS ON NON-TARGET SPECIES: A WORLDWIDE REVIEW (FAO
Fisheries Technical Paper No. 320, 1991), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/
T0502E/T0502E00.htm#TOC. High-seas driftnetting began in the 1970s, prompted by the
expulsion of foreign fisheries from newly expanded Exclusive Economic Zones and facilitated
by the development of strong thin nylon filament. See Sugarman, supra. The U.N. General
Assembly in 1991 called for a worldwide moratorium on large-scale high seas driftnet fishing
effective in 1993. G.A. Res. 46/215, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/215 (Dec. 20, 1991).
6.
E.g., H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The
Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
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fisheries had already declined, many believed those declines were cyclical
rather than the result of systematic overexploitation.7 There was a great deal
of skepticism that restraint on the part of fishermen would make a difference to population levels. Furthermore, the legal regime allowed vessels
from every nation to fish most of the world’s oceans, with the exception of
narrow territorial seas. That created a kind of prisoner’s dilemma. It made
little sense for any individual nation to restrict fishing when others might
not do so. That nations could only supervise vessels flying their flag made
the situation worse. Imposing stringent domestic regulations might simply
trigger a flight of vessels to flags of convenience, and nations with little
direct stake in fisheries could capture vessel registration revenues by offering
lax regulatory regimes.
A few fisheries were both sufficiently valuable and so obviously in
decline as to justify early negotiation of multilateral treaties allowing
stronger management. Whaling provides the most prominent example.
Several species of whales were hunted to near extinction by the early
twentieth century.8 Eventually the whaling nations realized that some form
of international regulation was necessary. In 1946, after a protracted gestation
period,9 they agreed to the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling (hereinafter the “Whaling Convention”),10 creating an ostensibly
science-driven process to set enforceable harvest limits at sustainable levels.
While the Whaling Convention for decades functioned more as a “whaling
club” than an effective conservation institution,11 its adoption signaled a
new willingness of fishing nations to cede authority to international
institutions.12
In the 1970s, pressure from nations anxious to limit the incursion of
foreign fishing fleets produced a dramatic shift in the other direction,
toward stronger national control of ocean resources. Sovereign interests
were expanded to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending as much as

7.
See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Ocean Governance and the Marine Fisheries Crisis: Two
Decades of Innovation—and Frustration, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 119, 119–20 (2001).
8.
For a brief history of whaling and its impacts on whale populations, see Lisa
Kobayashi, Lifting the International Whaling Commission’s Moratorium on Commercial Whaling as
the Most Effective Global Regulation of Whaling, 29 ENVIRONS 177, 180–84 (2006).
9.
For discussion of the history of the Whaling Convention, see Cinnamon Pinon
Carlarne, Saving the Whales in the New Millennium: International Institutions, Recent Developments and the Future of International Whaling Policies, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5 (2005).
10.
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat.
1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, [hereinafter ICRW] available at iwc.int/cache/downloads/1r2jdhu5xtus
wws0ocw04wgcw/convention.pdf.
11.
Id. at 6–7.
12.
Id. at 5.
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200 miles from the coast.13 That expansion brought a much larger proportion
of the world’s fisheries under national control, encouraging the development of domestic regulatory regimes for ocean fisheries.14
The earliest domestic ocean fishery management regimes relied primarily
on catch limits, coupled with seasonal and geographic closures and gear
restrictions. Fairly quickly, however, some important fishing nations began
to incorporate property rights approaches.15
In the 1980s, for example, individual transferable quotas (ITQs) were
assigned to participants in several fisheries in New Zealand and Australia.16
Initially, these quotas were quantitatively specific, meaning that quota holders
were given the right to harvest a specified mass of fish in perpetuity.17 That
approach turned out not to work very well, however, because the available
harvest in many fisheries varies widely from year to year. Within a few
years, fishery managers decided that a better strategy was to combine
property rights with catch limits. Fishery participants were assigned rights
to a proportion of the TAC, assuring them of a continued role in the fishery
without guaranteeing a specific level of harvest.18
“Catch shares,” as these proportional rights are often called, need not
be transferable. Nations seeking to maximize the economic productivity of
their fisheries, however, often make them transferable, sometimes subject to
restrictions. As implemented, therefore, the catch share strategy is typically
13.
This expansion of sovereign territory began with unilateral declarations by coastal
states such as the United States, but was then endorsed by the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, Art. 57, Dec. 10, 1982, 1883 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16,
1994), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_
e.pdf. See also Scheiber, supra note 7, at 126.
14.
Scheiber, supra note 7, at 126 (noting that “an estimated 85% or more of commercially exploitable fish stocks and all then-known exploitable seabed mineral resources were
located in the EEZ ocean areas”). Although the high seas contain only a small proportion of
commercially important ocean resources, transboundary, straddling and highly migratory
stocks are all beyond the regulatory control of any single nation. Katrina M. Wyman, The
Property Rights Challenge in Marine Fisheries, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 518 (2008).
15.
Indeed, fisheries economists had been among those arguing for expanded national
exclusive economic zones precisely because they saw division of the oceans into sovereign
territories as laying the essential groundwork for the establishment of property rights in
ocean resources. Id. at 512.
16.
Iceland may have been the first nation to try individual fishing quotas (IFQs),
starting in 1979. Ragnar Arnason, Ocean Fisheries Management: Recent International Developments, 17 MARINE POL’Y 334, 338 (1993). New Zealand seems to have jumped in most
enthusiastically. Since 1990, New Zealand’s fisheries have all been subject to catch share
management. Alison Rieser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisheries:
Contracting for the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 813, 823–24 (1997).
17.
John H. Annala, New Zealand’s ITQ System: Have the First Eight Years Been a
Success or a Failure?, 6 REVS. FISH BIOLOGY & FISHERIES 43, 45 (1996); Richard G. Newell
et al., Fishing Quota Markets, 49 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 437, 442 (2005).
18.
Id.

Doremus_Final_Web_Ready_FINAL_12May2013

Spring 2013]

7/18/2013 4:24 PM

Why International Catch Shares Won’t Save Ocean Biodiversity

391

an example of the more general “cap-and-trade” approach. Regulators set a
cap on the allowable harvest, assign industry participants rights to a portion
of that cap, and allow rights holders to sell or lease those rights to others.
Catch shares are currently the dominant property rights tools in fisheries
management worldwide.19
The expansion of catch share programs has coincided with a more general
shift from exclusively regulatory regimes toward market-based approaches
to environmental protection and resource management. In the 1970s, just
about the time that EEZs grew dramatically, economists (particularly in the
United States) began emphasizing the inefficiencies of uniform pollution
regulations and promoting the use of market-based tools such as tradable
permits as a more cost-effective approach.20 There is a prominent economic
literature arguing that the “evolution of property rights”—that is, the gradual
development of stronger individual property rights over time—is an
inevitable and desirable process for resources under exploitation pressure.21
Although many environmentalists were initially skeptical of property
rights approaches to pollution and resource management, many (though
certainly not all) have been won over, at least in a general sense. Property
rights approaches seem to offer pragmatic political benefits, reducing
resistance to environmental protection. One prominent example from the
United States is the acid rain program. Environmental advocates had been
agitating for twenty years for stronger control of the sulfur dioxide and
19.
It bears noting that catch shares and similar individuated strategies are not the
only form property rights-based fisheries might take. See Alison Rieser, Property Rights and
Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisheries: Contracting for the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 813,
818–29 (1997) (offering a taxonomy of potential property rights arrangements in fisheries);
Katrina M. Wyman, The Property Rights Challenge in Marine Fisheries, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 511
(2008) (arguing that the optimal property rights structure for fisheries is a context-sensitive
mix of public and private property rights). Because catch shares so dominate contemporary
policy discussions, however, they are the focus of the discussion in this paper.
20.
See, e.g., JOHN H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968); WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1975); BRUCE
ACKERMAN & WILLIAM HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981); ROBERT W. CRANDALL,
CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR
(1983); THOMAS TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING
POLLUTION POLICY (1985); Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of
Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1985); Albert M. McGartland & Wallace E. Oates,
Marketable Permits for the Prevention of Environmental Deterioration, 12 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 207 (1985).
21.
See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of
the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 167 (1975); Saul Levmore, Two Stories about the
Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421, S421 (2002); Gary D. Libecap & James
L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S589, S589 (2002). Although he did not use evolutionary language, Harold Demsetz
is the original source of these ideas. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights,
57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
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nitrogen oxide emissions responsible for acidification of lakes and streams
in eastern North America. Calls for stronger regulation were unsuccessful.22
But switching to a cap-and-trade strategy reduced industry resistance
sufficiently that an acid rain control program eventually made it through
the legislature in 1990.23 Today, that program is widely credited with reducing
emissions more rapidly and at far lower cost than industry had predicted
would be possible.24
Not surprisingly, given this bipartisan appeal, cap-and-trade approaches
have spread rapidly, including in the fisheries management world. By the
mid-2000s, management of at least 120 fisheries worldwide employed a
catch share strategy in some form,25 and property rights more generally had
become the dominant focus of fishery policy discussions.26 There are also
existing and developing markets for greenhouse gas emissions,27 for emissions
of conventional air pollutants,28 for discharges of pollutants to water,29 and
for endangered species habitat.30
22.
E. Donald Elliott, Lessons from Implementing the 1990 CAA Amendments, 40 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10592, 10595 (2010).
23.
Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, Title IV (1990) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o).
24.
See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, James L. Connaughton & Lesley C. Foxhall, Designing an International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, 15 NATURAL RES. & ENV’T 160,
161–62 (2001); A. DENNY ELLERMAN, PAUL L. JOSKOW & DAVID HARRISON, JR., PEW CTR.
ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE U.S.: EXPERIENCE, LESSONS,
AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 15 (May 2003), available at
http://www.c2es.org/publications/emissions-trading-us-experience-lessons-and-considerationsgreenhouse-gases.
25.
Christopher Costello et al., Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?, 321
SCIENCE 1678, 1679 (2008) [hereinafter Costello, Fisheries Collapse]; see also Richard G.
Newell et al., Fishing Quota Markets, 49 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 437, 437–38 (2005)
(asserting that fishing quotas have been instituted in more than fifteen countries for the
management of more than eighty species).
26.
E.g., Seth Macinko & Daniel W. Bromley, Property and Fisheries for the Twenty-First
Century: Seeking Coherence from Legal and Economic Doctrine, 28 VT. L. REV. 623, 625 (2004)
(“[C]ontemporary beliefs about the role and nature of property rights in fisheries seem to be
so strongly entrenched as to dominate nearly all discussions of fisheries policy.”).
27.
David Harrison, Jr. et al., Using Emissions Trading to Combat Global Climate Change:
Programs and Key Issues, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10367 (2008).
28.
Daniel A. Farber, Pollution Markets and Social Equity: Analyzing the Fairness of Cap
and Trade, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 10–16 (2012).
29.
Emissions Trading Moves to Water, But It’s Not as Simple, ENVTL. F., March–April
2003, at 62–69; CONSERVATION TECH. INFO. CTR., GETTING PAID FOR STEWARDSHIP: AN
AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITY WATER QUALITY TRADING GUIDE (July 2006), available at
http://ctic.org/media/users/lvollmer/pdf/GPfS_final%281%29.pdf; RENA STEINZOR ET AL.,
WATER QUALITY TRADING IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY (Ctr. for Progressive Reform, Briefing
Paper No. 1205, May 2012), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/
WQT_1205.pdf.
30.
See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl et al., A Practical Guide to Conservation Banking Law and Policy,
20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T., Summer 2005, at 26; Jonathan Remy Nash, Trading Species:
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Few of these markets are truly international yet, but there are increasingly
calls for international environmental trading systems. Carbon markets are
the most high-profile example,31 but fishery quota proposals are also
prominent. Some observers have long regarded the spread of individual
quota systems as inevitable.32 Recently, specific proposals for international
tradable quota systems for the harvest of ocean resources have begun to
appear. A few months ago, for example, a paper appeared in the highprofile journal Nature urging that the Whaling Commission create freely
tradable whale harvest permits.33 Commentators have also proposed the use
of catch shares in the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery,34 and the Indian Ocean
Tuna Commission is considering allocation of tradable quota shares to its
member states.35
Like enthusiasm for property rights approaches to environmental
protection in general, enthusiasm for such approaches to fisheries management, while expanding, is by no means universal. Opponents object to
privatization of a resource they view as peculiarly public,36 are skeptical of
the practical ability to implement property rights approaches,37 and fear the
potential distributional impacts.38

A New Direction for Habitat Trading Programs, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2007);
SPECIESBANKING.COM, http://www.speciesbanking.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing
itself as “a global information clearinghouse for a segment of biodiversity markets focusing
on biodiversity offsetting, compensation and offset banking”); Endangered Species Program,
For Landowners, Conservation Banking, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV.,
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/landowners/conservation-banking.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2012).
31.
The Kyoto Protocol included three mechanisms for trading carbon emissions
across international lines. Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade
and Complementary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 222–23 (2012). Although a successor
agreement to Kyoto has not yet been negotiated, it seems very likely that any such agreement
will include international emissions trading. For one form such trading could take, see Erin
Sedloff, Creating a Category Under the Kyoto Protocol Based on Non Emissions, 18 HASTINGS W.NW. J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 379 (2012).
32.
Arnason, supra note 16, at 339.
33.
Christopher Costello et al., A Market Approach to Saving the Whales, 481 NATURE
139 (2012) [hereinafter Costello, Market Approach].
34.
See Seth Korman, International Management of a High Seas Fishery: Political and
Property-Rights Solutions and the Atlantic Bluefin, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 697 (2010–11).
35.
Jeremy Noye & Kwame Mfodwo, First Steps Toward a Quota Allocation System in the
Indian Ocean, 36 MARINE POL’Y 882 (2012).
36.
See, e.g., Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and
the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 414 (1999).
37.
See, e.g., Eric M. Singer, Towards a Sustainable Fishery: The Price-Cap Approach, 24
TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 253, 285 (2011) (“That legal battles and a legislative moratorium have
resulted from the thorny issue of ITQ allocation suggests that, for political reasons, an
efficient ITQ system may be very difficult to implement in many fisheries.”); Parzival
Copes, A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries Management, 62 LAND
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II. FOR BETTER OR WORSE?
This is an opportune moment to examine the possibilities and limits of
property rights approaches as tools for international fisheries management.
Such approaches have yet to make substantial inroads on the international
scene, but are increasingly proposed as solutions to management of international ocean resources.39 Moreover, the oldest domestic catch share programs
have been in effect for thirty years now, and should provide some data about
the performance of property rights programs.
Although both proponents and opponents of property rights approaches
often seem to argue from faith-based absolutist stances, the reality is more
nuanced.40 Catch shares are not a silver bullet for the multiple problems of
ailing global fisheries any more than any other strategy is. I draw three
lessons relevant to international marine resources from the theory and
history of property rights approaches to fisheries management. First, the
usefulness of property rights strategies depends critically on the goals of
management. Property rights strategies were developed to promote the
economic efficiency of the fishing industry, but management goals are
typically more diverse than that.41 They may include limiting distributional
impacts, conserving target and non-target resources, and reducing political
conflict. Although catch shares can sometimes serve these other goals, they
do so less directly and not always effectively. Second, to the extent that
long-term stewardship of the targeted resource is an important goal, the
ability of a property-rights approach to advance that goal will depend on
both the economic context and the strength of fishery participants’ beliefs
that the fishery is both exhaustible and actually declining. The strength of
that perception will be affected by the type and extent of available data, but
ECON. 278, 281–88 (1986) (detailing some of the many things that can go wrong in implementation of ITQ systems).
38.
See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu and James E. Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the 1996
Sustainable Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799, 809 (1997) (noting that Greenpeace opposition
to IFQs rests in part on the desire to “keep[] fisheries in the hands of small entrepreneurs”);
SETH MACINKO & DANIEL W. BROMLEY, WHO OWNS AMERICA’S FISHERIES? (2002).
39.
See, e.g., ANTHONY COX, QUOTA ALLOCATION IN INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES 7–8
(OECD Food, Agriculture, and Fisheries Papers, No. 22, 2009), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/218520326143 (highlighting “the increased use of market mechanisms” such as “cap-and-trade systems . . . in combination with more traditional regulatory
and planning approaches”).
40.
The importance of context is beginning to be recognized. See, e.g., Mark Fina,
Evolution of Catch Share Management: Lessons from Catch Share Management in the North
Pacific, 36 FISHERIES 164 (2011) (concluding on the basis of the experience of one U.S.
fishery management council that “catch share management should be undertaken only as
specific fishery and management needs dictate”).
41.
U. Rashid Sumaila, A Cautionary Note on Individual Transferable Quotas, 15(3)
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 36 (2010) (“[I]t is clear that for fisheries managers, scientists, and the
public, fisheries management is not about economic efficiency alone.”).
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also by the level of trust in that data. Third, the success of catch share
programs depends on effective and credible enforcement institutions, which
have long been a limiting factor for conventional fisheries management.
Most catch share programs to date have been implemented in developed
nations, and have allocated fisheries under single-nation control. Even in
this context, catch shares are not always the right tool for the job. They are
much more likely to fail, however, in the international context, which
complicates disagreements about goals, can undermine trust, and is often
characterized by weak enforcement.

A. Goals Matter
Like many other environmental conflicts, fisheries disputes are “wicked
problems,”42 meaning they are not objectively definable. People with different
values and priorities see wicked problems differently and therefore identify
different solutions. Imagine, for example, a commercial fisherman and a
marine ecologist looking at a declining fishery. Each may believe that the
nature of the problem is obvious, but their views of it are likely to be
dramatically different. The commercial fisherman may focus on limited
industry profitability. The ecologist, by contrast, will likely assign greater
importance to long-term effects on ecosystem processes or changes in ecosystem structure. The two observers, given their very different perspectives,
may have difficulty even communicating with one another about what steps
to take, or what changes might count as solutions.43
Identifying and prioritizing goals is perhaps the most fundamental step
in addressing environmental problems, but one that is often skipped or
overlooked. It is a crucial step in deciding what role property rights
approaches should play in fisheries management. Management might, and
indeed typically does, have several goals, some of which are better served by
property rights strategies than others. The next sections discuss several
typical goals, and their relationship to rights-based management.

1. Economic Efficiency
Property rights were first identified as the solution to the “fishing
problem” by economists who defined that problem narrowly as economic
inefficiency in the fishing industry. In his seminal paper on the economics
of fisheries, for example, H. Scott Gordon sought to address “the plight of
42.
Horst W. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4
POL’Y SCIS. 155, 160–67 (1973).
43.
Fisheries scientist Ray Hilborn noted precisely this divergence of views in a 2007
paper. Ray Hilborn, Managing Fisheries is Managing People: What Has Been Learned?, 8 FISH
& FISHERIES 285, 286 (2007) (“[E]cologists and economists can have very different views of
a successful fishery . . . their solutions may differ because of their objectives.”).
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fishermen and the inefficiency of fisheries production,”44 and quoted with
approval an earlier economist’s definition of the fisheries problem as the
failure of the harvest “to yield a satisfactory living to the fisherman.”45 A
year later, following up on Gordon’s work, Anthony Scott similarly
described the problem as inefficient management of natural resources.46
Fisheries economists continue to endorse this description of the fisheries
problem.47
Both Gordon and Scott argued that a key goal of fisheries management
should be for fishers and their nations to capture, rather than dissipate, the
rents of resource extraction. They viewed a lack of firm property rights as
the key source of inefficiency. Economists today agree that lack of property
rights facilitates the overcapitalization that continues to plague global fisheries. Furthermore, they agree with Gordon and Scott that the race to
capture fish, made necessary by the lack of ownership rights to the unharvested fish, encourages wasteful fishing behavior.48 In their haste to catch all
the fish they can as quickly as they can, fishers may overwhelm processing
facilities, depress the market, and catch fish they cannot profitably sell. At
the extreme, fishermen are driven to a “derby-style” race that captures the
entire allowable catch in a few days.49 Derby fishing creates a number of
problems. It is unsafe.50 It often results in overshooting the TAC, so that

44.
Gordon, supra note 6, at 134.
45.
Id. at 125 (quoting A.G. Huntsman, Fishery Depletion, 99 SCIENCE 534 (1944)).
46.
Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. ECON. 116
(1955).
47.
See, e.g., Ragnar Arnason, Property Rights as a Means of Economic Organization, in
U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., USE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FISHRIGHTS99 CONFERENCE 14 (Ross Shotton ed., 2000).
48.
See, e.g., Costello, Fisheries Collapse, supra note 25; NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM NMFS-F/SPO-86, THE
DESIGN AND USE OF LIMITED ACCESS PRIVILEGE PROGRAMS 9 (Lee G. Anderson & Mark
C. Holliday, eds., 2007); R. Quentin Grafton et al., Incentive-Based Approaches to Sustainable
Fisheries, 63 CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 699 (2006). For a sharply contrasting view,
see Daniel W. Bromley, Abdicating Responsibility: The Deceits of Fisheries Policy, 34 FISHERIES
280 (2009).
49.
The best known example in the United States comes from the Alaska halibut
fishery, where the season averaged two to three days per year before a catch share program
was introduced. COMM. TO REVIEW INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS ET AL., SHARING THE
FISH: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY ON INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS 72 (1999) [hereinafter
SHARING THE FISH]. In 1994, just prior to adoption of the individual quota system, the
season was down to less than one day. Francis T. Christy, The Death Rattle of Open Access and
the Advent of Property Rights Regimes in Fisheries, 11 MARINE RESOURCE ECON. 287, 293
(1996). In the Alaska halibut fishery at its worst, more than six thousand vessels landed 23
million pounds of halibut in just a few days. Tipton, supra note 2, at 392.
50.
In the Alaska halibut fishery, for example, the Coast Guard answered twenty-nine
calls from sinking ships in a single season. Tipton, supra note 2, at 392.
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harvested fish may need to be discarded.51 It also necessarily pushes the
industry toward frozen as opposed to fresh fish, even if consumers prefer
the latter.52
In theory, both overcapitalization and wasteful fishing behavior can be
addressed by regulatory measures, but effective regulation is both politically
and practically challenging. Governments can force some participants out of
the market, but will face focused political opposition from identified losers.
Even if they are able to gather the necessary nerve to mandate market
contraction, governments may not correctly identify the most efficient
participants; they may end up forcing out the wrong group. Waste has been
effectively dealt with by regulation or the imposition of liability in another
common property context, that of the “capture” of oil and natural gas.53 But
those operations are fixed on the landscape, and observable, in ways that
fishing practices are not.
Property rights are certainly a conceptually appropriate tool for
addressing inefficiency. Not surprisingly, this is the goal catch shares have
most effectively served. Most observers agree that catch shares have
improved economic efficiency and reduced overcapitalization.54 There also
is substantial evidence that catch shares in some fisheries have reduced
wasteful fishing practices,55 and improved the value or yield of market
products.56

2. Wealth Distribution
Economists, who have been the primary proponents of property rights
approaches, typically do not prioritize wealth distribution as an important
aspect of solving the fishery problem. Their major professional goal is
efficiency. One reason they tend to gravitate toward market approaches is

51.
Id.
52.
SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 2–3. In some fisheries, the derby may be so
extreme that harvested fish cannot even be frozen before they rot. Tipton, supra note 2, at
392.
53.
Jim Rossi, The Political Economy of Energy and Its Implications for Climate Change
Legislation, 84 TULANE L. REV. 379, 384 (2009).
54.
See, e.g., SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 65, 85, 99. For a somewhat less
enthusiastic take on cap-and-trade programs in fisheries and other resource management
contexts, see Bonnie G. Colby, Cap-and-Trade Policy Challenges: A Tale of Three Markets, 76
LAND ECON. 638, 640 (2000) (“Actual transactions have been fewer, markets less competitive
and efficiency gains less impressive than predicted.”).
55.
SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 74–75 (after introduction of IFQs halibut
discards and the frequency of exceeding the TAC fell sharply).
56.
Id. at 34.
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that in a smoothly functioning market voluntary transactions should achieve
efficient outcomes regardless of the initial allocation of entitlements.57
Societies, however, are not necessarily indifferent to distributional
consequences. Whether distributional outcomes are “equitable,” as the
relevant society defines that term, can depend critically on the allocation of
entitlements. Achieving equity may be in tension with achieving efficiency.
In the fishery context, for example, programs that reduce overcapacity
almost necessarily decrease employment. Whether improvements in the
employment conditions for the remaining jobs outweigh the cost of the job
losses is a question on which reasonable minds are likely to differ.
Distributional concerns have driven much of the opposition to property
rights-based fishing regimes in the United States.58 The notion of private
rights in fisheries is inherently inconsistent with long-standing egalitarian
norms about access to fishery resources.59 Opponents of catch shares worry
that small fishers will be priced out of the industry, that fishing-dependent
communities will suffer or even disappear, and that crew members of fishing
vessels will be transformed from the economic partners of vessel owners to
subordinate wage earners.60
There is evidence that some catch share programs have had precisely
these sorts of distributional effects, reducing employment and increasing
the market share of large operators.61 These concerns can be addressed by
limiting the transferability of catch shares, but such limitations inevitably
have efficiency costs. The relative importance assigned to efficiency and
equity, therefore, is important not only to the decision to use catch shares or
not, but also to the design of any catch share program.
57.
This is the famous “Coase Theorem.” See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
58.
Colby, supra note 54, at 646.
59.
On those norms, see, for example, Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap,
Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1005, 1006–
07 (1982).
60.
See, e.g., Hsu and Wilen, supra note 38, at 808 (noting that individual fishing
quota strategies “will almost certainly have distributional consequences,” including a likely
reduction in employment in the fishing industry, and potential impacts on related industries
in fishing-dependent communities); id. at 809 (noting that Greenpeace opposition to IFQs
rests in part on the desire to “keep[] fisheries in the hands of small entrepreneurs”);
SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 87 (noting concerns in Icelandic fisheries about “the
emergence of the relations of dependency associated with ‘fishing for others’ ”).
61.
See, e.g., Evelyn Pinkerton & Danielle N. Edwards, The Elephant in the Room: The
Hidden Costs of Leasing Individual Transferable Fishing Quotas, 33 MARINE POL’Y 707 (2009);
B. Timothy Heinmiller, The Politics of “Cap and Trade” Policies, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 445,
463–64 (2007) (reporting that the introduction of individual quotas in the U.S. surf
clam/ocean quahog fishery has increased the incidence of absentee quota ownership);
SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 64 (noting that employment in the U.S. surf
clam/ocean quahog fishery decreased after the introduction of catch shares) and 85 (noting
increase in market concentration in the Icelandic herring fishery).
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3. Resource Stewardship: Target and Non-Target Species
In the 1950s, when Gordon and Scott called for the assignment of
property rights in fisheries, stewardship, to the extent it was a concern at
all, was strictly an aspect of the economic problem. Long-term sustainable
yield of target species might be sufficiently valuable that it would justify
restraint in short-term harvesting behavior. So long as fisheries remained
open-access, however, no participant would have the economic incentive to
exercise self-restraint. Property rights, by providing the promise of long-term
security, could help fishery participants make the socially optimal trade-off
between long and short-term economic gains.62
Modern societies tend to take a broader view of resource stewardship,
although the priority assigned to stewardship in relation to maximizing
industry profitability certainly varies among nations. Sustainable long-term
yield of target species remains the core of stewardship, but some societies
also have a goal of protecting non-target resources, such as other fish species
and, more broadly, marine ecosystems. Even where that is not an independent
goal, fishery participants are more aware than they were fifty years ago of
the linkages between target species and other ecosystem features, and
therefore of the potential need to protect more than the target species.63
Modern proponents of property rights-based fisheries management
contend that secure property rights encourage greater concern for stewardship. Fishers who expect to have a long-term stake in the future of the
fishery should be more interested in the fishery’s long-term health.64
Furthermore, by removing pressure to race to capture the fish, catch shares
should allow more careful fishing practices, helping to avoid overruns of the
TAC and reducing bycatch and discards.65
Conceptually, the position that property rights will increase incentives
for stewardship is sometimes, but not always, compelling. If a stock is highly
valuable but slow to reproduce, or if there is substantial risk that the future
will reduce demand for the product, it will be economically rational for
property rights holders to deliberately court a “boom-bust” cycle, or even to

62.
Gordon, supra note 1, at 141; Costello, Fisheries Collapse, supra note 25, at 1679.
63.
In the United States, for example, Congress has explicitly recognized that “[o]ne
of the greatest long-term threats to the viability of commercial and recreational fisheries is
the continuing loss of marine, estuarine, and other aquatic habitats.” 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(9)
(2006).
64.
See, e.g., David Festa, Diane Regas & Justin Boomhower, Sharing the Catch,
Conserving the Fish, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Winter 2008, at 75; Costello, Fisheries Collapse,
supra note 25.
65.
See supra text accompanying notes 48–52; Karol de Zwager Brown, Truce in the
Salmon War: Alternatives for the Pacific Salmon Treaty, 74 WASH. L. REV. 605, 683–87 (1999).
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knowingly extirpate a stock.66 Without an effective regulatory backstop,
quota holders may also be tempted to “high-grade,” discarding less valuable
(generally smaller) fish in order to fill their quota with the most marketable
specimens.67 Finally, catch shares, like other cap-and-trade allocations but
unlike property rights in land, typically are not guaranteed to be permanent.68
To the extent that the issuer retains the prerogative to reduce or withdraw
shares without compensation, catch shares will not provide firm incentives
for sustainable practices.69
The evidence that property rights have actually increased the health of
fisheries remains limited. A 2008 study comparing the depleted status of
fisheries with their use of a catch share approach offered tantalizing results.
The comparison revealed that catch share fisheries were roughly half as
likely as others to have collapsed and that the longer catch shares had been
in use, the further from collapse the fishery tended to be.70 It is hard to tell,
however, whether other features might explain those results. Catch share
fisheries, for example, necessarily have a TAC. Not all fisheries are managed
by TACs, and it might be that the imposition of a total catch limit is a more
important driver in preventing collapse than how the TAC is divided
among fishery participants.71
Two more recent studies have tried to separate the effects of catch
shares from other factors. They came to less enthusiastic conclusions. Both
studies found little relationship between the use of catch shares and the
66.
Bromley, supra note 48, at 282; see also Sumaila, supra note 41. The whaling industry
of the early- to mid-20th century showed both these characteristics. Not surprisingly, even
in an industry with a small number of players and substantial barriers to entry, restraint was
conspicuously missing. In that context, profit maximization calls for rapid exploitation, even
if property rights are secure. C.W. Clark & R. Lamberson, An Economic History and Analysis
of Pelagic Whaling, 6 MARINE POL’Y 103, 111–14 (1982).
67.
See, e.g., Hsu & Wilen, supra note 38, at 809; SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at
108–10.
68.
See SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 97 (“Most of the existing IFQ programs
define the legal status of an IFQ as a ‘revocable privilege,’ not a permanent enfranchisement.”).
In the United States, the law authorizing “limited access privilege programs,” as they are
termed, specifically says that they may be revoked or modified at any time without compensation. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b)(2)–(3) (2006).
69.
See, e.g., Ransom E. Davis, Individually Transferable Quotas and the Magnuson Act:
Creating Economic Efficiency in Our Nation’s Fisheries, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 267, 308–
09 (1996).
70.
Costello, Fisheries Collapse, supra note 25, at 1680.
71.
Bromley, supra note 48, at 284; see also Patrick W. Gilmour et al., Beyond Individual
Quotas: The Role of Trust and Cooperation in Promoting Stewardship of Five Australian Abalone
Fisheries, 35 MARINE POL’Y 692, 692 (2011) (suggesting that factors other than catch shares
might be responsible for the results reported by Costello et al.); Josh Nowlis & Arthur A.
Van Benthem, Do Property Rights Lead to Sustainable Catch Increases?, 27 MARINE RESOURCE
ECON. 89 (2012) (suggesting that improved monitoring and catch reporting could be a
factor).
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exploitation rate (proportion of biomass harvested) or population status.72
The authors concluded that “many of the elements of the fishing system—
including the economic and social systems—that promoted overexploitation
prior to catch shares largely persisted after catch shares were implemented.”73
An earlier study of fisheries that converted to catch shares found that about
two-thirds experienced at least temporary declines in stock levels.74
There is also indirect evidence that catch shares reduce pressure on target
species. The National Research Council, in a landmark 1999 study on individual fishing quotas, found that catch share fisheries were less likely to
exceed the regulatory TAC,75 presumably because fishing can be carried out
more carefully and over a greater period of time. On the other hand, there
is also evidence of “high-grading” in some fisheries.76
There is little evidence on the question of whether catch share
approaches affect stewardship of non-target resources. There are theoretical
reasons both for optimism—because catch shares reduce economic incentives
for wasteful practices, including some that increase bycatch—and for
skepticism—because catch shares do nothing to produce a long-term profit
incentive for preservation of resources that are not marketable. What
evidence there is suggests that the answer is context-specific. In some cases,
catch share fisheries seem roughly equivalent to those managed by conventional regulation in terms of bycatch and discards.77 On the positive side of
the ledger, in the Alaska halibut fishery, the elimination of derby fishing by
an individual quota approach seems to have sharply decreased “ghost fishing”
by lost or abandoned gear.78 On the negative side, environmentalists have
complained that Alaska pollock quota holders have shown little concern for
the status of the endangered Steller sea lion.79
72.
Timothy E. Essington et al., Catch Shares, Fisheries, and Ecological Stewardship: A
Comparative Analysis of Resource Responses to a Rights-Based Policy Instrument, 5
CONSERVATION LETTERS 186 (2012); Michael C. Melnychuk et al., Can Catch Share Fisheries
Better Track Management Targets?, 13 FISH & FISHERIES 267 (2012).
73.
Essington et al., supra note 72, at 193.
74.
Tom Tietenberg, The Tradable-Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: Lessons
for Climate Change, 19 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 400, 405 (2003).
75.
SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 35.
76.
Id., at 108–10.
77.
Id. at 36 (citing C.M. DEWEES & E. UEBER, EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT FISHERY
MANAGEMENT SCHEMES ON BYCATCH, JOINT CATCH, AND DISCARDS: SUMMARY OF A
NATIONAL WORKSHOP (Cal. Sea Grant Coll. Program, Report No. T-CSGCP-019, 1990)).
78.
SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 3, 73–74.
79.
Wyman, supra note 14, at 540. The decline of the western Alaska Steller sea lion
population remains poorly understood, but one hypothesis is that the large-scale commercial
fisheries in the region, including the highly valuable pollock fishery, could be taking such a
large share of the sea lions’ prey that they are contributing to nutritional stress. For a
detailed account of the controversy, see Beth C. Bryant, Adapting to Uncertainty: Law, Science,
and Management in the Steller Sea Lion Controversy, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 171 (2009).
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4. Conflict Reduction
Another goal of management strategies may be to reduce conflict.
There is some evidence from the pollution context that cap-and-trade
approaches, especially combined with grandfathering, have reduced one
specific brand of conflict, industry opposition to the imposition of emission
caps.80 But that evidence is equivocal and difficult to interpret. Caps have
often been set unrealistically high, 81 which makes them easy for industry to
accept. And the industry view of caps depends heavily on the political
context, which varies with the political strength of environmental advocates.
Emphasizing a market-based approach, for example, did not get greenhouse
gas emission reduction mandates through the U.S. Congress in 2009.82
While industry clearly prefers a market approach (at least a lax market
approach) to command-and-control regulation, it prefers no regulation at all
to cap-and-trade.
In the fisheries context, the primary discussion of conflict has focused
on conflict between regulators and commercial fishers over TAC limits.
There is a strong perception that the fishing industry has pushed constantly,
and often successfully, for unrealistically high catch limits.83 Property rights
proponents argue that property rights approaches can address this problem
by reducing incentives for fishery participants to push for larger and larger
allowable catches. The idea is that fishers who have a long-term stake in the
fishery have less reason to resist short-term catch reductions imposed with
the aim of increasing the prospects for long-term sustainability. Improving
the profitability of fisheries can further reduce conflict by reducing the
extent to which conservation regulations “are perceived as threats to livelihood
and fishing cultures,”84 and therefore strenuously resisted.85
80.
See, e.g., Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., Breaking the Logjam: Environmental
Reform for the New Congress and Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5 (2008); Thomas
W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 297–98; Carol M. Rose,
Hot Spots in the Legislative Climate Change Proposals, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 189, 192 (2008).
81.
See Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving
Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 410 (2009) (“The empirical evidence from
existing cap-and-trade programs suggests that caps have not been very stringent. Rather,
there has been a tendency in program design and implementation toward overallocating
allowances.”).
82.
See, e.g., H. Joseph Drapalski, The Viability of Interstate Collaboration in the Absence
of Federal Climate Change Legislation, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 469, 470 (2011).
83.
See, e.g., J.R. Beddington, D.J. Agnew & C.W. Clark, Current Problems in the
Management of Marine Fisheries, 316 SCIENCE 1713, 1713 (2007) (“[O]vercapacity can, via the
political process, lead to the erosion of management control.”).
84.
Rod Fujita & Kate Bonzon, Right-Based Fisheries Management: An Environmentalist
Perspective, 15 REVS. IN FISH BIOLOGY & FISHERIES 309, 310 (2005).
85.
Id. Regulators who are less worried about causing bankruptcy and unemployment
may also be more willing to set realistic catch limits. See R. Quentin Grafton et al., Incentive-
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I am not aware of any systematic comparison of conflicts over catch
limits in fisheries with and without catch shares, but there are reports that
holders of catch shares have lobbied for reductions in total catch,86 or have
voluntarily kept harvests under the regulatory limit.87 Others, however,
note that conflict and political maneuvering around TAC levels have not
ended in fisheries managed by catch shares.88
There are at least three reasons why catch share approaches do not
necessarily reduce conflict over TACs. One is that fishery participants
might have a higher discount rate than regulators, which would mean that
fishers are, rationally, more interested in short- than long-term gains. That
could be true if the fishers believe that short-term profits can be invested
profitably,89 that if the current fishery collapses there will always be another
one to which they can turn, or that their catch shares are likely to be limited
or revoked in the future. Another possible explanation is psychological. In
general, people are inclined to see the world as they would like it to be,
interpreting equivocal or conflicting evidence in the way that most favors
their interests.90 Fishers, therefore, will not necessarily accept that fisheries
are declining just because scientists or regulators say they are. Holders of
catch shares who genuinely believe their target species are not overfished
will rationally push for higher TAC levels even if they seek a sustainable
outcome.
Catch share and other property rights approaches also create conflict
over allocation of rights. In an open access fishery, no allocation decisions
are required. Anyone who wants to can participate in the fishery; success is
determined by the skill or luck of the fishers. Property rights strategies, by
contrast, require political decisions about who will have access at what cost.
Because industry participants are deeply invested in the outcome of these
allocation decisions, they frequently become the subject of high-stakes

Based Approaches to Sustainable Fisheries, 63 CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 699, 701
(2006).
86.
See, e.g., id. at 702.
87.
See SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 69–70 (reporting that pressure to
increase the South Atlantic wreckfish TAC disappeared after individual quotas were introduced and landings fell to less than 25% of the TAC); id. at 110 (giving other examples of
“underfishing,” that is, catches below the TAC, in quota-managed fisheries).
88.
Heinmiller, supra note 61, at 455.
89.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
90.
See, e.g., Daniel Sarewitz, How Science Makes Environmental Controversies Worse, 7
ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 385, 390–92 (2004); Naomi Oreskes, Science and Public Policy: What’s
Proof Got to Do With It?, 7 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 369, 375 (2004); Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 258–59 (2000);
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 304–
06 (2000).

Doremus_Final_Web_Ready_FINAL_12May2013

404

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

7/18/2013 4:24 PM

[Vol. 2:2

political battles.91 Furthermore, participants with an emotional or cultural
stake in the industry involved often demand limits on trading to protect the
initial rights allocation.92 Small fishing enterprises, for example, may want
assurances that large firms will not be able to buy up the entire quota.
But demand for trading limits can go well beyond market share
concerns. One of the economic arguments for tradable permits is that they
allow environmentalists who want resources left unharvested or unsullied to
put their money where their mouths are by buying and retiring use rights.
Industry participants, however, tend to resist opening the market to conservation interests. Property rights enthusiasts frequently point out that the
U.S. acid rain market includes annual auctions in which environmental
groups can purchase SO2 emission allowances for the purpose of retiring
them.93 It’s important to realize, though, that the SO2 market is the exception
rather than the rule. Even in that market, only a very small proportion of
allowances are auctioned,94 and the environmental benefits of conservation
purchases have been negligible.95
In other contexts, industry participants have fiercely resisted the
attempts of conservation interests to enter a resource allocation market. In
the United States, for example, the federal government offers permits to
graze livestock on federal lands. Conservationists seeking to acquire permits
in ecologically sensitive locations for the purpose of removing livestock
have come up against a statutory framework that does not allow them to do
so.96 A similar dynamic has played out in other cap-and-trade contexts,
where “[r]ather than quietly exiting production, some lower valued users
resist trading their rights, often through political action seeking to preserve
or erect barriers to free entitlement trading.”97 This is especially likely
when, as is the case with fisheries, participants attach emotional or cultural,
as well as monetary, value to the behavior in question.98
91.
See Heinmiller, supra note 61, at 456–61 (providing examples from cap and trade
programs for water, fisheries, and greenhouse gases).
92.
See Heinmiller, supra note 61, at 461–461.
93.
See Jacob Kreutzer, Cap and Trade: A Behavioral Analysis of the Sulfur Dioxide
Emissions Market, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 125, 129 (2006).
94.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7651o(b) (2006) (requiring that EPA hold 2.8% of allowances for
periodic auction).
95.
Kreutzer, supra note 93, at 138.
96.
See Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999), affirmed 529 U.S.
728 (2000) (striking down regulation allowing issuance of conservation use permits); David
G. Alderson, Buyouts and Conservation Permits: A Market Approach to Address the Federal Public
Land Grazing Problem, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 903 (2005) (proposing statutory amendments
to permit conservation use).
97.
Heinmiller, supra note 61, at 451; see also Colby, supra note 54, at 644 (noting resistance of agricultural interests to development of water markets in the western United States).
98.
Heinmiller, supra note 61, at 461.
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Another potential source of conflict is disagreement about the morality
of the permitted behavior, or about the message that commodifying the
behavior may send. One objection to trading of air pollution allowances in
the United States has been that “turning pollution into a commodity to be
bought and sold removes the moral stigma that is properly associated with
it.”99 That concern has been answered primarily by pointing out that the
“cap” in “cap-and-trade” limits the amount of pollution just as more traditional regulatory approaches do, and by efforts to clarify the costs cap-andtrade systems impose on heavy polluters.100 Public opinion has not crystallized around strong moral objections to trading in pollution rights, perhaps
because there is general agreement that pollution cannot, as a practical
matter, be completely eliminated. The strong moral objection will have real
force, though, if a significant portion of the relevant population views the
permitted activity as per se unacceptable. Most fishing does not carry the
same ethical overtones as pollution but, as discussed in more detail below,
the recent proposal for tradable whale harvest permits has brought this
objection to markets to the fore.101
A related objection, that tradable permits improperly privatize public
resources, has more general force in the fisheries context because of the
strong tradition of public ownership of fisheries in many nations. Even if
environmentalists are allowed to participate in a resource market, if they
regard the rights to a healthy resource as a public entitlement they will
object to being expected to pay to ensure that entitlement is respected.102

5. Fisheries Goals in the International Context
Individual nations often have multiple goals for management of their
fisheries. In the United States, legislatively declared goals remain primarily
economic, focused on maximum long-term harvest by a robust domestic
fishing industry. The federal Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act includes among its listed purposes promotion of domestic

99.
Michael J. Sandel, It’s Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997,
at A23.
100.
See Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution
Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 529–32 (2000)
(rejecting the argument that commodifying pollution is immoral, but acknowledging that
there may be “pedagogical” concerns about the message the public takes away from institution
of trading schemes).
101.
See infra Part III.A.
102.
See Colby, supra note 54, at 645 (noting in the context of western U.S. water
markets that “environmental advocates resent the fact that they must pay off irrigators in
order to acquire water for ecosystem restoration”).
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commercial and recreational fishing;103 maintaining the “optimum yield” from
each fishery;104 and fully developing under-utilized domestic fisheries.105
Economic efficiency, however, is not the only goal of U.S. fisheries
management. All management measures must “consider” efficiency, but
none can “have economic allocation as its sole purpose.”106 Ecological
stewardship is an implicit goal. It is national policy to minimize bycatch107
and to foster and maintain the diversity of fisheries.108 “Optimum yield” is
defined as the harvest level which “will provide the greatest overall benefit
to the Nation . . . taking into account the protection of marine ecosystems.”109
Equitable allocation is also a goal. The Act’s purposes provision does not
explicitly mention equitable allocation of the harvest, but it does note the
special dependence of coastal areas on fishing110 and calls for consideration
of the social and economic needs of states and their citizens.111 The national
standards governing fishery management plans require that any allocation
of fishing privileges be “fair and equitable to all [U.S.] fishermen,”112 and
prevent excessive concentration of catch shares.113 Management measures
are supposed to minimize adverse economic impacts on fishing communities
to the extent practicable.114
International fishery management goals are at least as diverse. The
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ratified by
nearly all coastal nations,115 is the primary statement of international goals
for ocean resource management. It explicitly endorses efficiency, equitable
allocation, and ecological protection.116 UNCLOS declares the sovereign
103.
16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(3)(2006).
104.
Id. § 1801(b)(4).
105.
Id. § 1801(b)(6).
106.
Id. § 1851(a)(5).
107.
Id. § 1801(c)(3).
108.
Id. § 1801(c)(6).
109.
Id. § 1802(33)(A).
110.
Id. § 1801(a)(3).
111.
Id. § 1801(b)(5), (c)(3).
112.
Id. § 1851(a)(4)(A).
113.
Id. § 1851(a)(4)(C).
114.
Id. § 1851(a)(8).
115.
The United States remains the conspicuous exception. Despite strong support
from the administration, the military, the Chamber of Commerce, and former presidents of
both political parties, ratification efforts fell short yet again in 2012. See Keith Johnson, GOP
Scuttles Law-of-Sea Treaty, WALL ST. J. WASHINGTON WIRE (July 16, 2012, 5:06 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/07/16/gop-opposition-scuttles-law-of-sea-treaty/;
Stewart M. Patrick, (Almost) Everyone Agrees: The U.S. Should Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty,
ATLANTIC (June 10, 2012, 7:21 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/
06/-almost-everyone-agrees-the-us-should-ratify-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty/258301/.
116.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397, pmbl. [hereinafter UNCLOS], available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_
agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (parties recognize the desirability of establishing a
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rights of coastal nations to exploit the resources of their EEZ,117 but qualifies
those rights with duties to consider the economic needs of coastal fishing
communities118 and to maintain the populations of both target and nontarget species.119 Despite the nods to ecological goals, the objective of maximum sustainable yield retains primacy. The management target for living
resources is described as “optimum utilization;”120 coastal states without
sufficient domestic capacity to harvest the total allowable catch must allow
other states access to the “surplus.”121 UNCLOS maintains the traditional
rights of all nations to fish on the high seas,122 subject to a duty to cooperate
in developing measures to conserve both target and non-target species.123
Conflict reduction is not an explicit goal of either U.S. fisheries law or
UNCLOS, but it is implicit in most resource management regimes. As
noted earlier, conflict over quota allocation is a common feature of domestic
cap-and-trade strategies. Conflicting views of fairness and the voluntary
nature of international law make allocation conflicts both sharper and more
significant in the international context.
The conflicts are sharper because the extent and intensity of disagreement tends to be greater. Differing contexts, histories and cultures mean
that nations and their peoples take very different views of what constitutes
a fair distribution of resources. The challenges of negotiating the Kyoto
Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions and the so-far fruitless search for a
successor agreement illustrate the depth of these differences, and the difficulty of bridging them. The Kyoto Protocol adopted emission reduction
targets based on past emissions for industrialized nations. It imposed no
limits on emissions by developing countries. Each side of this divide objected
to the way the other sides’ obligations (or lack thereof) were calculated.124
Developing nations took the view that it would be unfair to restrict their
development progress given their low past emissions. The United States
took a very different view, refusing to ratify the Protocol largely on the
ground that the exemption of rapidly developing countries like China and

legal order which will promote “the equitable and efficient utilization of [marine] resources,
the conservation of [marine] living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of
the marine environment”).
117.
Id. at Art. 56(1)(a).
118.
Id. at Art. 61(2).
119.
Id. at Art. 61(4).
120.
Id. at Art. 62(1).
121.
Id. at Art. 62(2).
122.
Id. at Art. 116.
123.
Id. at Arts. 117–120.
124.
See, e.g., Paul Baer, Equity, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Global Common Resources,
in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY 393, 394 (Stephen H. Schneider et al. eds., 2002);
Michael Grubb, The Economics of the Kyoto Protocol, 4 WORLD ECON. 143, 145 (2003).
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India was unfair to their economic competitors.125 The search for an allocation
scheme acceptable to all the major players continues to dog negotiations
over a successor treaty.126 The populous developing nations urge a per capita
allocation system,127 but that approach is unlikely to prove acceptable to the
United States.128
Fishery catch share programs don’t arouse the same level of allocation
conflict as greenhouse gas emissions because they have much smaller
economic and social impacts. Nonetheless, there are very real divisions
between developed and developing nations, coastal and landlocked nations,
and nations with established as opposed to new fishing fleets about how
ocean resources should be fairly divided.
Differing views about fairness are especially problematic in the international context because of the need for voluntary commitments. Within
nations, distributive conflicts of this sort can certainly be uncomfortable,
and can delay or soften action, but there are at least mechanisms for overcoming the objections of a minority if the majority can muster sufficient
political will. The politics of creating property rights systems are daunting
in the domestic context;129 they are even more so in the international
sphere. There is no international law procedure for overriding the objections
of sovereign nations, even if the will to do so exists. They are free to remain
outside any agreement, as the United States has remained outside
UNCLOS and the Kyoto Protocol. That makes negotiating international
agreements among nations with very different interests and value systems
extraordinarily challenging.
Catch shares, which cannot be introduced without resolving both the
initial allocation issue and issues of subsequent transferability, bring that
challenge squarely front and center. If an agreement can be reached at all,
the unwillingness or inability to confront difficult allocation questions is
likely to bring in through the back door the pressure on TACs that catch
share programs are supposed to reduce.

125.
Baer, supra note 124, at 394.
126.
Norichika Kanie et al., Allocation and Architecture in Climate Governance Beyond
Kyoto: Lessons from Interdisciplinary Research on Target Setting, 10 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS
299, 300-01 (2010).
127.
See Eric A. Posner and Cass A. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated
on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51, 53 n.6 (2009) (collecting sources).
128.
Id. A variety of other proposals have been advanced, focusing on emissions
compared to GDP or distinguishing between “essential” and “luxury” emissions. See DANIEL
BODANSKY, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE EFFORTS
BEYOND 2012: A SURVEY OF APPROACHES 13–14 (2004), available at http://www.c2es.org/
docUploads/2012%20new.pdf.
129.
See, e.g., Colby, supra note 54, at 655.
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B. Information and Trust
The major source of conflict in domestic fisheries regulated by conventional management methods has been over the details of regulatory
conservation measures. A TAC is often the primary such measure; it may
be replaced or supplemented by seasonal or geographic closures and gear
restrictions. Conservation measures are the focus of persistent and intense
conflict in many fisheries.
Because information is often limited and equivocal, setting conservation
measures is a difficult technical challenge, one that leaves plenty of room
for argument.130 Just as cap-and-trade pollution programs do not eliminate
the challenge of determining the acceptable pollution level, catch share and
other rights-based fishery programs do not remove the technical problem of
setting a TAC.131 Rights-based fisheries may also require other regulatory
measures, such as seasonal or area closures, since both the biological impact
and the economic value of harvest may vary with time and place.132
The evidence supporting regulatory measures for specific fisheries is
often fraught with uncertainty.133 To complicate matters further, the multiple
elements of that uncertainty are difficult to identify, much less quantify.
Fishery managers are only beginning to systematically take on that task.134
For the moment, not only is there much managers don’t know about the
fisheries they are in charge of, they often do not know how much they don’t
know.
High, and uncertain, levels of uncertainty about sustainable catch levels
or the need for other management measures foster overly optimistic thinking,135 invoking a phenomenon psychologists call “motivated reasoning.”
People selectively interpret information and access memories and beliefs in
ways that lead to their desired conclusion.136 This process can influence the
interpretation of scientific evidence. People are more critical of studies they
130.
See, e.g., GEORGE LAPOINTE ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, COUNTING FISH
101: AN ANALYSIS OF FISH STOCK ASSESSMENTS (2012), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2012/09/27/39347/counting-fish-101/.
131.
SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 107.
132.
Robert T. Deacon et al., Improving Efficiency by Assigning Harvest Rights to Fishery
Cooperatives: Evidence from the Chignik Salmon Co-op, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 479, 504–05 (2008).
133.
See, e.g., R. Ian Perry et al., A Framework for Providing Scientific Advice for the
Management of New and Developing Invertebrate Fisheries, 9 REV. FISH BIOLOGY & FISHERIES
125, 130 (1999) (noting the “potential for large errors” in the stock estimates needed to
support TAC determinations “and the relatively high cost of reducing these errors”).
134.
See Stephen Ralston et al., A Meta-Analytic Approach to Quantifying Scientific
Uncertainty in Stock Assessments, 109 FISHERY BULL. 217 (2011).
135.
Ezra M. Markowitz & Azim F. Shariff, Climate Change and Moral Judgment, 2
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 243, 244 (2012).
136.
Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 483
(1990).
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are motivated to disbelieve.137 Motivated reasoning is not intentional;
desires influence conclusions even when people intend to objectively evaluate
the evidence, and sincerely believe they are doing so.138 Evidence perceived
as sufficiently strong can force people into uncomfortable conclusions. But
motivated reasoners may never get to the point of recognizing even a robust
scientific consensus, because people tend to look harder for information
supporting their beliefs and to place greater trust in the expertise of others
who share their worldviews.139
Motivated reasoning is quite likely to operate in the fishery management
context. Fishery participants with powerful emotional and financial ties to
their occupation will be strongly motivated to believe the fishery is healthy,
and that conservation measures that would reduce their harvest or increase
their costs are not necessary. High levels of uncertainty in the data will
exacerbate the tendency of fishery participants to see it in the most optimistic
light.140 Although this insight is supported by theoretical and experimental
psychology, it is really just common sense. Resource users who don’t believe
the resource is under threat will not happily reduce their use, even if they
hold secure property rights.141
Catch shares might reduce the motivation for that belief somewhat by
lengthening fishers’ time horizons or reducing financial strain, but they will
not eliminate motivated reasoning. Larger TACs and fewer other conservation measures are going to look better to fishery participants with or
without catch shares. That catch share holders might genuinely desire to
maintain a sustainable fishery will not protect them against unconsciously
interpreting ambiguous or conflicting stock assessments as supporting a
large catch.
Distrust of the scientists who provide technical information about the
status of the fishery, or of the regulators charged with determining what
consequences follow, will exacerbate the dynamic of doubt. This phenomenon
is already observable in domestic fisheries, where regulators have tended to
set TACs at or even above the high end of the uncertainty range offered by
137.
Id. at 489–90.
138.
Indeed, reminding people of the importance of objectivity can actually reinforce
motivated reasoning. Dan M. Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems
for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2011).
139.
Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RES. 147,
149–50 (2011).
140.
See, e.g., Daniel Sarewitz, How Science Makes Environmental Controversies Worse, 7
ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 385, 390–93 (2004); Naomi Oreskes, Science and Public Policy: What’s
Proof Got to Do With It?, 7 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 369, 375 (2004); Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 258–59 (2000);
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 304–
06 (2000).
141.
Gilmour, supra note 71, at 701.
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their technical advisors.142 It seems likely to be worse in the international
context, where fishery participants are further removed, politically and
culturally, from those they are being asked to trust, and where the participants
distrust not just the regulators but each other.
Together, conflicting goals and heightened distrust make specifying
conservation measures even more of a challenge in international than in
domestic fisheries. In the early years of its existence, for example, the
Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), a
regional fishery management organization, regularly failed to reach agreement
on a TAC. Finally, after a ten-year, multi-million dollar development
process, the CCSBT adopted a process for setting TACs that does not
require annual negotiation.143

C. Administration and Enforcement
The third challenge for catch share programs is their dependence on
effective administration, monitoring, and enforcement. This problem is not
unique to a catch share strategy, of course. Conventional fishery management
also carries administrative costs and requires monitoring and enforcement
efforts. But property rights strategies impose some unique challenges,
which are magnified in the international context.
As explained above, conventional fishery management requires the
development, imposition, and enforcement of a TAC and other measures
such as gear limits, area closures, and seasonal restrictions. Shifting to a
catch share strategy does not eliminate the need for these difficult and
controversial technical decisions. Instead, property rights-based fishery
management actually adds a new administrative dimension. Regulators
must be able to track ownership of quota shares, monitor individual catch,
and compare catch to share holdings. The administrative tasks are particularly
complex in multispecies fisheries, leading some observers to argue that
catch shares are impractical in the multispecies context.144
Beyond setting conservation measures, enforcing them has long been a
significant problem in many fisheries, because harvest activities occur over
large and often remote geographic areas and landings and sales can be difficult
to track through decentralized and informal markets. Moving to catch
142.
Josh Eagle & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Answering Lord Perry’s Question: Dissecting
Regulatory Overfishing, 46 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 649 (2003).
143.
Tom Polacheck, Assessment of IUU Fishing for Southern Bluefin Tuna, 36 MARINE
POL’Y 1150, 1160 (2012).
144.
See, e.g., Copes, supra note 37, at 285–86. But see James N. Sanchirico et al., CatchQuota Balancing in Multispecies Individual Fishing Quotas, 30 MARINE POL’Y 767 (2006)
(arguing that flexibility mechanisms can be used to make multispecies catch share fisheries
both profitable and sustainable).
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shares does not remove the enforcement challenges.145 Enforcement problems
are common, even in developed nations146 and even in catch share fisheries.147
In some fisheries, catch shares may even increase the costs of enforcement
because they make longer seasons possible148 and provide incentives for
high-grading.149 “Quota busting,” illegal harvest in excess of quota shares
owned, can be extensive.150 This is not surprising. Shifting to catch shares
reduces the number of individuals with a legal right to fish; those left out of
the system, if they lack other options, will be motivated to continue fishing
illegally.
Because of this dynamic, increased monitoring of catch and landings
has been necessary following a shift to catch shares in some fisheries.151
New Zealand and Iceland, where catch share approaches are widespread,
have among the highest per vessel fisheries management costs.152 Increased
enforcement costs need not be an insurmountable problem, however. In
theory, at least, they can be financed from the increased profitability of the
fishery.153
Enforcement is, institutionally as well as practically, especially difficult
in international fisheries. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU)
fishing within EEZs and on the high seas is a major obstacle to developing
sustainable global fisheries.154 IUU fishing encompasses both fishing that
contravenes applicable regulations and fishing that is entirely outside the
regulatory system.155 It “has proved stubbornly resistant to recent international attempts to control it.”156
Institutionally, IUU fishing is facilitated by systematic gaps in the
international fisheries regulatory regime. On the high seas (those areas that
lie outside national EEZs), fisheries are regulated, if at all, by regional
145.
Setareh Khalilian et al., Designed for Failure: A Critique of the Common Fisheries
Policy of the European Union, 34 MARINE POL’Y 1178, 1179 (2010).
146.
Landings in the European Union have regularly exceeded the TAC in a variety of
fisheries. José-María da Rocha et al., The Common Fisheries Policy: An Enforcement Problem, 36
MARINE POL’Y 1309, 1311 (2012).
147.
SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 98.
148.
SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 107.
149.
Beddington, Agnew & Clark, supra note 83, at 1714.
150.
SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 92.
151.
SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 83.
152.
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE COSTS OF MANAGING
FISHERIES 31 (2003).
153.
SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 176.
154.
HIGH SEAS TASK FORCE, CLOSING THE NET: STOPPING ILLEGAL FISHING ON
THE HIGH SEAS 2 (2006) [hereinafter CLOSING THE NET]; Elise Anne Clark, Strengthening
Regional Fisheries Management—An Analysis of the Duty to Cooperate, 9 N.Z. J. PUB. INT’L L.
223, 229 (2011).
155.
CLOSING THE NET, supra note 154, at 16.
156.
Id. at 3.
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fishery management organizations (RFMOs). Nations that do not voluntarily
become parties to these organizations are not legally subject to their conservation measures.
Even nations that are members of RFMOs do not always vigorously
implement their provisions.157 It is difficult to control fishing by or under
the auspices of rogue nations because UNCLOS generally gives the flag
state exclusive jurisdiction over ships on the high seas.158 Multilateral
agreements can expand inspection authority, but only with respect to
nations that choose to join those agreements.159 Several notorious “flag of
convenience” states refuse to sign on. This allows large-scale vessels bearing
their flag to fish legally without regulation, ignoring conservation
measures,160 even though they may be owned by nationals of parties to the
relevant agreements.161
Practically, the economic rewards of IUU fishing swamp the resources
available for enforcement. “IUU fishing is a high reward, low risk activity.”162
Fish are a valuable commodity in global markets. Enforcing fishery regulations is costly163 because harvests occur over wide areas, and illegally caught
fish can be disguised by processing or mixed with legal catch without much
risk of detection. In less developed countries, management and enforcement
resources are simply unavailable. Even in wealthy nations, fishery management and enforcement often do not get the resources they need because
they are not seen as high priorities.164 Furthermore, IUU fishing activities
often cross national borders; fish caught illegally on the high seas may be
trans-shipped in one nation’s territory and sold in the markets of one or
more other nations. Detecting and punishing those activities requires that
authorities in all the relevant nations have the technical means and the
willingness to share data in real time. Institutional frameworks for that
sharing have proven elusive.165 Finally, the penalties for IUU fishing, which
UNCLOS limits to fines rather than imprisonment for activities occurring
beyond any nation’s territorial sea, may not provide adequate deterrence,166
especially in light of the low probability of apprehension. Ironically, the
157.
It appears, for example, that the Japanese longline fleet has been responsible for a
significant amount of IUU catch of southern bluefin tuna. Polacheck, supra note 143, at 1154.
158.
UNCLOS, supra note 116, art. 92(1).
159.
CLOSING THE NET, supra note 154, at 35–36.
160.
Id. at 36.
161.
Id. at 36.
162.
Id. at 25.
163.
The European Union and its member states, for example, reportedly spend about
$362 million annually monitoring fishing activities, or roughly 5% of the value of landings in
the region. Id. at 25.
164.
Id. at 24.
165.
Id. at 28–29.
166.
Id. at 32–33.
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IUU problem has been made worse by the adoption of catch share programs
within EEZs. By reducing fleet capacity in domestic waters, as they are
designed to do, those programs have pushed excluded vessels onto the high
seas.167

III. NOT EVERY PROBLEM IS A NAIL
The previous Section demonstrated that catch share approaches can
effectively serve some goals in some places, but are less well suited to other
goals and other contexts. Of course, the question is never whether property
rights approaches would function perfectly, but how they stack up against
possible alternatives. Even if catch shares have serious problems, they might
still be the best available choice. Determining that requires contextsensitive consideration of the specific problem being targeted. At minimum,
however, it should not be blithely assumed that every fishery problem is
best solved by a property rights approach.
Closer examination of two recent proposals for adoption of property
rights strategies for global fisheries provides concrete examples of two ways
such approaches can fall short. The first, the proposal for tradable whale
harvest permits, simply does not connect with the essence of the problem.
Rather than a solution to the gridlock plaguing the Whaling Convention, it
is a distraction, diverting attention from the fundamental reasons for that
gridlock. The second, dealing with southern bluefin tuna, is a situation in
which property rights are a more conceptually appropriate solution, but
their application presents substantial practical difficulties which are likely
to be common in the international context.

A. Tradable Whale Permits
Recently in the high-profile journal Nature, economist Christopher
Costello and ecologists Steven Gaines and Leah Gerber proposed the
introduction of tradable whale hunting permits.168 Their focus on tradable
permits (essentially catch shares for whales) is understandable, but off target.
In order to understand why tradable permits won’t solve the whaling problem,
we must briefly review the history of international whaling regulation.
Whales were one of the first ocean resources to arouse international
concern. By the late nineteenth century, technological advancements includ167.
Id. at 49.
168.
Costello, Market Approach, supra note 33. These authors are not the first to suggest
a tradable whale quota system, but their proposal has gotten the most attention. Earlier
versions include: Anthony Matera, Whale Quotas: A Market-Based Solution to the Whaling
Controversy, 13 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 23 (2000); Clark and Lamberson, supra note 66,
at 116.
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ing steamships and explosive harpoons had sparked a global whale rush that
threatened several species with extinction.169 A few whaling nations introduced domestic restrictions, and attempts to craft an international
agreement limiting whaling began early in the twentieth century.170 By the
late 1930s, some but not all of the largest whaling nations had agreed to
size, species, and area restrictions.171 Continued unsustainable pressure on
whale stocks finally led to negotiation of the Whaling Convention,172 which
took effect in 1948.
At its origin, the Whaling Convention was aimed at sustainable exploitation, not preservation.173 In its first quarter century, it failed miserably at
that aim. By the early 1970s, whale stocks were crashing as the nascent
environmental movement raised global concern.174 In 1972, the United
Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment called for a
whaling moratorium.175 The United States, which had decided to end
domestic commercial whaling, proposed a moratorium in subsequent meetings of the International Whaling Commission (IWC), the regulatory body
established by the Whaling Convention.176 The IWC rejected the proposal.177
The Whaling Convention, however, had sowed the seeds of a radical
change in institutional direction when it structured the IWC to give each
member nation one vote178 and invited any nation to join.179 Whaling opponents mounted a campaign in the late 1970s to recruit non-whaling states to
sign on to the Whaling Convention.180 Environmental nongovernmental
organizations such as Greenpeace were actively engaged in this campaign;
their pitch was not that whaling was at unsustainable levels, but that it was
“morally repugnant.”181 By 1982, enough non-whaling nations had signed on

169.
Gerry J. Nagtzaam, The International Whaling Commission and the Elusive Great
White Whale of Preservationism, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 390 (2009).
170.
Id. at 391–92.
171.
Id. at 395; Carlarne, supra note 9, at 4–5.
172.
See ICRW, supra note 10.
173.
In the Convention’s Preamble, the parties recognized an interest in “safeguarding
for future generations the great natural resources represented by the whale stocks,” but went
on to assert that “properly regulated” whaling would allow increased harvest “without
endangering these natural resources.” Id. at pmbl. Their stated goal was “to provide for the
proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the
whaling industry.” Id.
174.
Nagtzaam, supra note 169, at 404–05.
175.
Carlarne, supra note 9, at 7 n.38.
176.
Nagtzaam, supra note 169, at 408.
177.
Id.
178.
ICRW, supra note 10, at Art. III(1).
179.
Id. at Art. X(2).
180.
Nagtzaam, supra note 169, at 413–14.
181.
Id. at 414.
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to the Whaling Convention to tip the balance. The IWC adopted a moratorium on commercial whaling, effective in 1986.182
The moratorium has been hotly debated since its adoption. Although
the rhetorical battle has been largely fought in scientific terms, it remains
grounded in the moral intuitions that originally motivated the moratorium.183
Within the IWC, whaling opponents have strategically couched their objections in terms of sustainable harvest.184 This sort of dissonance between
motives and rhetoric is familiar in environmental conflicts. Science has long
struck environmentalists as a sounder political ground for their arguments
than ethics,185 so that underlying moral objections are often submerged in
the formal debate. Moreover, the Whaling Convention itself requires scientific rhetoric, since it mandates that IWC regulations “be based on scientific
findings.”186 The result is a classic “science charade;”187 both supporters and
opponents of the moratorium couch their dispute in scientific terms, hiding
the persistent value differences that divide them. At the Stockholm Conference, for example, when Japan objected that a whaling moratorium was not
scientifically justified, anti-whaling nations asserted that their scientists said
otherwise.188 When it finally adopted the moratorium, the IWC promised
that the data supporting it would be continuously reviewed, and suggested
that it would remain in place only as long as the science justified it.189
182.
Carlarne, supra note 9, at 8–9.
183.
Whaling opponents might hold one or more of at least three moral positions: first,
they could regard all whaling as ethically wrong, because whales are sentient creatures,
because of their complex social structure, or because for some other reason whales are
entitled to a right to live; second, they could regard whaling as wrong to the extent it causes
whales pain and fear, and be convinced that commercial whaling cannot be conducted without
employing unacceptable methods; or third, they could regard whales as species of incalculable
value, so that any anthropogenic increase in the risk of whale extinction is wrong, or at least
must be balanced by an extraordinarily high human benefit. Of course, objections to whaling
are not necessarily that consciously considered. As one observer puts it: “most people in the
United States [a leading proponent of the IWC moratorium] find the thought of whaling
utterly barbaric, and the idea of eating whales utterly disgusting...” Alyson Decker, Save the
Whales–Save the Whalers–Wait, Just Save the International Whaling Commission: A Fresh Look at
the Controversy Surrounding Cultural Claims to Whale, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 253, 253
(2006).
184.
Nagtzaam, supra note 169, at 418–19.
185.
See generally Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a
New Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11 (2000).
186.
ICRW, supra note 10, Art. V(2)(b).
187.
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1613 (1995).
188.
A.W. Harris, The Best Scientific Evidence Available: The Whaling Moratorium and
Divergent Interpretations of Science, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 376
(2007).
189.
“This provision will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice,
and by 1990 at the latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the
effects of this decision on whale stocks and consider modification of this provision and the
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Rather than ending whaling, the moratorium, which is “riddled with
loopholes and exceptions,”190 has made whaling more difficult for the international community to regulate.191 Norway, which took an exception to the
moratorium and therefore is not legally bound by it, openly engages in
commercial whaling.192 Iceland briefly left the Whaling Convention only to
return subject to an exception to the moratorium. Like Norway, it has
resumed commercial whaling.193 Japan makes extensive use of the scientific
research exception in the Whaling Convention.194
Whaling has become a perennial source of international controversy,
and a flashpoint for friction between otherwise allied nations.195 The conflict
is not confined to diplomatic arenas. Sea Shepherd, a nongovernmental
organization which describes itself as “the most aggressive and most
successful whale-saving organization in the world,”196 actively confronts
whalers at sea, going so far as to ram or attempt to disable their vessels.197
Sea Shepherd has lost some of its own boats through these tactics,198 which

establishment of other catch limits.” See Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to International Law, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 431, 435–36 n.4 (1985) (reproducing the text of the moratorium).
190.
Carlarne, supra note 9, at 9.
191.
Including commercial, research, and subsistence whaling, “[a]lmost 2,000 whales
are now harvested each year.” Costello, Market Approach, supra note 33, at 139.
192.
Peter Davies, Iceland and European Union Accession: The Whaling Issue, 24 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 26–27 (2011).
193.
See Letter from Gary Locke, Sec’y of Commerce, to President Barack Obama
(July 19, 2011), available at http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2011/pdfs/pellygrant
signedletter_final.pdf (certifying “that Iceland, by permitting its nationals to engage in
commercial whaling and exporting endangered fin whale meat, is diminishing the effectiveness of the IWC conservation program”).
194.
ICRW, supra note 10, Art. VIII(1). Iceland, Norway, and Russia have also granted
themselves scientific research permits in the past, but have discontinued that practice.
Nagtzaam, supra note 169, at 429–31.
195.
Ongoing Efforts Within the International Whaling Commission (IWC) Regarding Its
Future: Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Int’l Org., Human Rights, and Oversight, and
Subcomm. on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Env’t, 110th Cong. (2010) (statement of David A.
Balton, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and Int’l Envtl. and Scientific Affairs,
U.S. Dep’t of State), available at http://www.state.gov/e/oes/rls/remarks/2010/143167.htm.
196.
The History of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and Whaling, SEA
SHEPHERD CONSERVATION SOC’Y, http://www.seashepherd.org/whales/sea-shepherdhistory.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2012).
197.
Anthony L.I. Moffa, Two Competing Models of Activism, One Goal: A Case Study of
Anti-Whaling Campaigns in the Southern Ocean, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 201, 209 (2012). Sea
Shepherd claims to have sunk at least 5 whaling ships. SEA SHEPHERD CONSERVATION
SOC’Y, supra note 196.
198.
Editorial, Whales for Sale, 481 NATURE 114 (2012).
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have drawn charges of piracy.199 In 2011, however, Sea Shepherd succeeded
in forcing the Japanese fleet to end its research whaling season early.200
Entrenched positions on both sides have left the IWC “mired in a
prolonged stalemate.”201 Whaling proponents have adopted the strategy
that worked so well for the other side in the 1980s, recruiting their own
allies to join the IWC.202 The moratorium remains in place, but perpetually
contested. The situation has undermined respect for the IWC, which is now
widely regarded as both ineffectual and dysfunctional.
Costello and his coauthors offer tradable whale catch shares, which they
term “whale shares,” as a solution to the IWC crisis.203 They propose that
“ ‘whale shares’ would be allocated in sustainable numbers to all member
nations of the IWC, who would have the choice of exercising them, leaving
them unused for a year or retiring them in perpetuity.” 204 Whale shares
would be tradable in a global market.205 Costello et al. assert that their
tradable permit proposal “stands a good chance of being acceptable both to
anti- and to pro-whaling constituents.”206
In light of the current dysfunction of the IWC, no possibility should be
dismissed out of hand. The whale shares prescription, however, is highly
unlikely to improve the health of the IWC.207 Putting aside for the moment
the fact that it would require renegotiation of the Whaling Convention,208 a
barrier that is likely insurmountable, it simply does not match the problem.
199.
A U.S. court rejected that charge, but did find that Sea Shepherd had likely
violated international shipping regulations. Institute of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd
Conservation Society, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1226, 1233, 1235 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
200.
Martin Fackler, With Whaling Ships Under Attack, Japan Will Recall Fleet, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011, at A8.
201.
Balton, supra note 195.
202.
See Nagtzaam, supra note 169, at 422–23; Decker, supra note 183, at 261. Whaling
opponents also continue to play the numbers game. Nagtzaam, supra note 169, at 445.
203.
Costello, Market Approach, supra note 33, at 139–40. See also Casey Watkins,
Whaling in the Antarctic: Case Analysis and Suggestions for the Future, 25 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 49,
76 (2012) (proposing to combine a regulated whale harvest with “a market based exchange
for whaling permits”).
204.
Costello, Market Approach, supra note 33, at 140.
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
207.
For a similarly skeptical view of an earlier proposal for tradable whale quotas, see
Decker, supra note 183, at 278 (arguing that a tradable whale quota system “would most likely
lead to further unrest within the IWC”).
208.
The convention authorizes the ICW to adopt regulations fixing species, seasons,
locations, size limits, maximum catch, gear, measurement methods, and record requirements.
ICRW, supra note 10, at Art. V(1). It specifically precludes, however, regulations on the
“number or nationality of factory ships” and the allocation of “specific quotas to any factory
ship or land station or to any group of factory ships or land stations.” Id. at Art. V(2). At
best it is open to question whether that language allows any kind of tradable quota system,
much less the allocations by nation that Costello et al. recommend.
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Catch shares are primarily good at reducing overcapacity, increasing the
profitability and economic efficiency of fisheries. Overcapacity and inefficiency are not the cause of the IWC’s gridlock. Instead, the gridlock follows
directly from the divergent, deeply held values of the parties. A tradable
quota system would not address that conflict.
The whale share proposal would not break the existing gridlock because
it would provide little advantage to those most deeply invested in the issue.
The proposal’s authors are naïve to expect either side of the conflict would
back their proposal. The whaling nations will not like the idea because they
are deeply invested in their continuing right to whale, not primarily as an
economic matter but as a cultural one.209 Whaling has become a marker for
their sovereign right to self-determination.210 Whaling restrictions are seen
both as objectionable in their own right and also as a potential harbinger of
inroads on other fishing rights.211
The whaling nations are not likely to endorse a system that requires
them to share the initial allocation of quota with nations lacking any history
of whaling, and even with nations deeply opposed to whaling.212 They would
also undoubtedly strongly resist a trading system open to conservation
interests, because it would undermine what they see as the purpose of the
IWC, facilitating development of a sustainable whaling industry.213
Costello et al. do not explain why they think whale shares would be
attractive to whaling nations. They note that a similar proposal floated
before adoption of the moratorium went nowhere, and they speculate that it
might have been ahead of its time or doomed by the fact that permits would
have been auctioned rather than allocated without charge.214 Although the
idea will be familiar this time, it still will not offer any substantial
advantage over the current situation to whaling nations. They would get
their shares for free, but would still have to buy shares from other nations if
they wanted to harvest the full sustainable quota.
One might argue that the whaling nations face a different situation
now, with the moratorium in effect, than they did when the earlier proposal
was made. In fact, however, the moratorium has relatively little effect on
whaling nations given the availability of objections and the research exemp209.
Decker, supra note 183, at 262.
210.
Id. at 270.
211.
Phillip J. Clapham et al., The Whaling Issue: Conservation, Confusion and Casuistry,
31 MARINE POL’Y 314, 318 (2007).
212.
Indeed, there is a very pragmatic shortcoming of that allocation proposal, which is
that it would encourage nations with no interest in the whaling issue to join the Whaling
Convention simply to obtain potentially valuable quota allocations.
213.
Whaling Convention, supra note 10, at pmbl. (reciting that the parties have
“decided to conclude a convention to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks
and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry”).
214.
Costello, Market Approach, supra note 33, at 139.
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tion. It is not clear that their whale harvest would increase under the whale
share proposal. Indeed, to the extent that the whaling nations think IWC
quota decisions will be tainted by political pressures from anti-whaling nations, they might well prefer not to return to whaling under IWC regulation.
Alternatively, one could argue that the whaling nations currently escape
the moratorium only at the cost of international condemnation. It’s not
clear, however, that catch shares would change that dynamic, to the extent it
exists. As explained below, catch shares would not change the views of those
most opposed to whaling, or their attempts to bring global public pressures
to bear. As for other nations, in fact, continued whaling since adoption of
the moratorium has brought few consequences. In the United States, the
Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967215 and the
Packwood Amendment to the Magnuson-Stevens Conservation Act216
require that the Secretary of Commerce identify foreign fishing operations
which diminish the effectiveness of the Whaling Convention. Such nations
must be denied access to fishing in U.S. waters, and may be subject to trade
sanctions.217 No sanctions have ever been imposed under these amendments, however, and threats of sanctions in recent years have had little
effect.218 International pressure seems unlikely to provide a strong motivation
for the whaling nations to endorse whale shares.
Opponents of whaling are equally unlikely to find whale shares attractive.
Those who view whaling as a moral wrong will not be mollified by introduction of a whale share market, even if they are allowed to participate.
Costello et al. suggest that Sea Shepherd ought to support a market because
it could save money by turning from its present campaign of harassment of
whaling ships to the purchase of whale shares.219 That suggestion shows just
how little thought these authors have given to the activists’ goals or psychology. Anti-whaling activists are not going to change their tactics based
on an analysis of the dollar cost per whale life saved. They are committed to
convincing the world that whaling is morally unacceptable. The IWC moratorium, even with its loopholes, sends that message, which can be amplified
by dramatic anti-whaling harassment campaigns. A whale permit trading
system would send the very different message that whaling is acceptable
within limits. Expecting Sea Shepherd to support a whale share market is
like expecting anti-abortion activists to welcome a market in abortion permits.
Conflicts grounded in fundamentally divergent moral views cannot be solved

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

22 U.S.C. § 1978 (2006).
16 U.S.C § 1821(e)(2) (2006).
Carlarne, supra note 9, at 39.
Id. at 39–40.
Costello, Market Approach, supra note 33, at 140.
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by the introduction of markets, and the whaling moratorium controversy is
precisely that sort of conflict.
Even if that value conflict could be overcome, setting a sustainable and
politically acceptable TAC would remain problematic under a catch share
approach. One major driver of the moratorium was the IWC’s history of
authorizing unsustainable harvests. The latest whale share proposal would
not reduce the pressure for high TACs. It calls for shares to have a short
life, on the order of ten years.220 That is not likely to be long enough to
encourage economic whalers to prefer sustainable harvests. Even permanent
catch shares probably would not have that effect; whale fisheries have long
been held up as the paradigmatic example of a context in which even those
holding permanent property rights could rationally prefer a “boom-andbust” approach.221 The whale shares proposal might even exacerbate the
pressure for high TACs, since quota would offer a potential economic windfall
to Whaling Convention members that have never before had a financial stake.
Another problem for the IWC has been credible enforcement. It has
always relied on voluntary enforcement by the parties,222 who have not been
strongly motivated to comply. Before the moratorium, even the unrealistically high TACs were routinely exceeded.223 The United States has played a
backup enforcement role through its willingness to threaten trade sanctions
against nations whose whaling undermines the effectiveness of the IWC.224
That threat, however, has become less credible, and less effective, over
time.225 Concerns about the effectiveness of enforcement have provided one
significant ground for objections to lifting the moratorium.226 Moving to a
catch share approach would further complicate enforcement efforts by
diffusing responsibility. It would be difficult to blame any particular nation
for the failure of whalers who buy shares on the open market to adhere to
their share limits. That difficulty would be magnified if share ownership
were open to vessels flying flags of nonparties.
In sum, a catch share approach is not likely to offer much benefit to the
IWC. It would not solve the core dispute, borne of differing values and
cultures, over whether harvesting whales is ethically permissible and if so
under what circumstances. Nor would a catch share approach reduce the key
technical and practical barriers to setting and implementing sustainable
whale quotas. It would, however, pose new and difficult questions about
220.
Id.
221.
See sources cited supra note 61.
222.
Carlarne, supra note 9, at 38.
223.
Nagtzaam, supra note 169, at 401–02.
224.
Carlarne, supra note 9, at 38–40; see also Locke supra note 193 (letter certifying
Iceland as subject to sanctions).
225.
Carlarne, supra note 9, at 40.
226.
See, e.g., Clapham et al., supra note 211, at 317.
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how quota should be divided, who could participate in the market, and who
would be responsible for assuring that both official market players and
others abide by the quota limits. Arguing about those questions would be an
unhelpful distraction from addressing the very real problems of the IWC.
There is no easy answer to those problems. Pretending (or hoping) that
catch shares will provide one will simply facilitate further avoidance of the
root causes of the conflict.

B. Bluefin Tuna Management
The bluefin tuna is a wonder of nature—large, fast, long-lived and
beautiful. As marine scientist Carl Safina puts it:
The bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) is a creature of superlatives.
Growing to 1500 pounds (700 kilos), traveling on trans-oceanic
migrations, and reputedly capable of swimming 50 miles (90 km)
per hour, it is one of the largest, most wide-ranging and fastest of
animals. To anyone who has seen this saber-finned giant explode
through the surface of the sea, it is among the most magnificent.227
It is also exceptionally valuable; early in 2012, a single bluefin sold at auction
in Tokyo for $736,000, or well over $1200 per pound.228 Not surprisingly,
fishing pressure on the bluefin has been intense, resulting in steep population declines. Two of the three bluefin species, the Atlantic bluefin and the
southern bluefin, are at high risk of extinction.229 In 2010, the United States
unsuccessfully sought a ban on international trade in Atlantic bluefin
through the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species.230
Because bluefin are highly migratory, their management requires international cooperation. Tuna are managed by five RMFOs; the Atlantic
bluefin is under the jurisdiction of the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), while the southern bluefin is
managed by both the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and by the
227.
Carl Safina, Bluefin Tuna in the West Atlantic: Negligent Management and the Making
of an Endangered Species, 7 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 229, 229 (1993).
228.
Malcolm Foster, Bluefin Tuna Auctioned in Tokyo for Record $736,000, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 5, 2012) http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Latest-News-Wires/2012/
0105/Bluefin-tuna-auctioned-in-Tokyo-for-record-736-000.
229.
B.B. Collette et al., High Value and Long Life—Double Jeopardy for Tunas and Billfishes, 333 SCIENCE 291, 291 (2011).
230.
David Jolly & John M. Broder, U.N. Rejects Shielding Bluefin and Polar Bears, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, at A8. A year later, the United States itself found that the Atlantic
bluefin does not warrant listing under the Endangered Species Act. Endangered Species Act
Listing Determination for Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, 76 Fed. Reg. 31,556 (June 1, 2011). The
U.S. continues to authorize fishing for the Atlantic bluefin in accordance with ICCAT
prescriptions.
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Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT).
Each sets a TAC for bluefin catch within its jurisdiction, and allocates that
total catch among its parties and cooperating nonparties.
The current paradigm is widely recognized as an international failure.
Recent performance reviews of the three RFMOs responsible for bluefin
management have been highly critical. All three suffer from difficulties
setting TACs, including reluctance to accept the advice of scientific advisors.
They also have all had trouble allocating the TAC among parties and cooperating nonparties, monitoring compliance with the TAC, and controlling
IUU fishing.231
Frustration with the current state of bluefin management has produced
a range of proposals, including tradable quotas. A thoughtful student note
has argued that, while not without difficulties, a catch shares approach to
Atlantic bluefin management would significantly improve conservation
outcomes.232 An observer of the IOTC’s struggle to develop a viable quota
allocation system does not go so far as to advocate an international catch
share scheme, but does note that “[t]echnical advice as to what management
regime for international tuna fisheries is best or most effective does seem to
be moving towards a concept of rights based management involving transferable quotas.”233
Unfortunately, catch shares are unlikely to improve the lot of the bluefin
or its ecosystem because the catch share solution is not well-suited to the
bluefin overfishing problem. First, as detailed above, what catch shares do
best is reduce over-capacity, where there is broad recognition that overcapacity is a problem and willingness to let the market decide the identity
of fishery participants. Over-capacity is a problem in bluefin fisheries,234
but with a unique twist. In some areas, longline fishing for swordfish and

231.
See INDIAN OCEAN TUNA COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE IOTC PERFORMANCE
REVIEW PANEL 33 (Jan. 2009); INT’L COMM’N FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ATLANTIC
TUNAS, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW, (Sept. 2008); COMM’N FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF S. BLUEFIN TUNA, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT EXPERT (Sept. 2008).
232.
Seth Korman, Note, International Management of a High Seas Fishery: Political and
Property-Rights Solutions and the Atlantic Bluefin, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 697 (2011).
233.
Jeremy Noye & Kwame Mfodwo, First Steps Toward a Quota Allocation System in the
Indian Ocean, 36 MARINE POL’Y 882, 887 (2012).
234.
Ussif Rashid Sumaila & Ling Huang, Managing Bluefin Tuna in the Mediterranean
Sea, 36 MARINE POL’Y 502, 502 (2012) (“[V]essel capacity, vessel power and new storage
innovations for BFT [Blue Fin Tuna] experienced tremendous increases in the 1980s and
1990s, which imposed severe pressure on the BFT stock.”); see also Harry N. Scheiber,
Kathryn J. Mengerink & Yann-huei Song, Ocean Tuna Fisheries, East Asian Rivalries, and
International Regulation: Japanese Policies and the Overcapacity/IUU Fishing Conundrum, 30 U.
HAW. L. REV. 97, 104 (2007) (noting international calls for Japan to reduce capacity in its
longline tuna fishing fleet).
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other tuna produces bluefin bycatch.235 This bycatch is difficult to predict or
control, especially on an individual boat basis, so it would be difficult for
participants in those other fisheries to acquire the necessary catch shares.
There also are operators in other fisheries who target bluefin opportunistically; given its great value, bluefin is a kind of lottery fish offering the
potential for an occasional high payoff.236 Additionally there are charter
operators and recreational fishermen who target bluefin among other species,
but cannot easily predict the likelihood of one or more catches in a particular
year. That adds another dimension to allocation disputes, and indeed recreational fishermen have been among the fiercest opponents of proposals for a
U.S. domestic bluefin catch share program.237
Second, the economics of the bluefin fishery do not create incentives
for long-term sustainable fisheries. With big fish carrying six-figure price
tags and the species already dwindling, fishers might rationally conclude
that their best strategy is to get what they can while they can. Tuna-fishing
nations seem to have been pursuing that strategy, constantly pushing for
higher quotas, within the framework of the RFMOs. Catch share fisheries
still require TACs, which would still have to be set by the RFMOs, which
so far have proven unwilling or unable to follow the advice of their own
scientists.
Third, catch share approaches are already possible in the bluefin fishery
at a domestic level, as they are for many fisheries managed by RFMOs. The
tuna RFMOs allocate the total allowable catch among parties and cooperating
nonparties. Quota-holding nations are, with some restrictions on transfer to
other nations, free to allocate their share of the catch as they see fit.
Australia has used a catch share program to allocate its southern bluefin
tuna quota since 1984.238 Some of the Australian catch shares are leased by
Japanese vessels.239 The United States is considering a catch share program
for its quota of Atlantic bluefin.240 The benefits of catch shares, in other
235.
Richard Gaines, Feds Eye New Rules for Bluefin Tuna Catch, GLOUCESTER TIMES,
May 18, 2012.
236.
See Charles A. Witek III, Comment to Can Catch Shares Help the Bluefin Tuna
Fishermen and Stocks?, SAVE THE BLUEFIN TUNA (Dec. 24, 2009, 8:46 AM),
http://savethebluefin.com/profiles/blog/show?id=2166344%3ABlogPost%3A5382&commentI
d=2166344%3AComment%3A5384.
237.
See Letter from Jeff Miller & Mike Ross, Cong. Sportsmen’s Caucus, to Doug
Boyd, Gulf of Mexico Fishery Mgmt. Council (July 25, 2012) (urging the Council to “refrain
from instituting . . . catch shares in the Gulf of Mexico until further scientific, economic,
and demographic assessments have taken place.”) (on file with author), available at
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words, are already available in the bluefin fishery, through domestic regulation. At least some of those shares are available on a transnational market.
It seems unlikely that an international trading scheme would add sufficient conservation benefits to offset the transaction costs of creating it.
Developing nations with artisanal fisheries would surely oppose such a
scheme, because it would almost certainly end up concentrating quota in the
hands of distant water fishing fleets from wealthy nations. Nations with
significant recreational fisheries might also be opposed to a universal trading
system. There would be little benefit for conservation interests. Even if
trading were open to them, quota prices would likely be too high to be
attractive. Even the most ardent conservationist would likely balk at spending
hundreds of thousands of dollars to save a single fish.
Fourth, trading would not address the many technical challenges of
bluefin management. Bluefin fishing would still have to be overseen in a
spatially explicit, and complex, way. Geography matters in the bluefin fishery,
in ways that remain poorly understood. There is considerable uncertainty
about both spawning and migration behavior.241 Any market in bluefin catch
shares would have to be geographically limited, which would increase the
complexity of oversight while reducing the efficiency gains from allowing
trades. Bycatch regulation would also remain necessary. Global tuna fisheries
produce substantial bycatch of seabirds, sea turtles, marine mammals,
sharks, and unmarketable finfish.242 Catch shares by themselves would do
nothing to control that bycatch.
Catch shares also would do little to close the enforcement gap. IUU
fishing has been a notorious problem for bluefin management, and not just
for the developing nations participating in the fishery. According to a Pew
Environment Group study, the amount of Atlantic bluefin traded in the
market in 2010 was two-and-a-half times the official quota.243 Another
study implicated European governments in that trade.244 The root problem
seems to be a lack of political will to take bluefin fishing restrictions
seriously. Catch shares, in theory, could provide increased resources for
enforcement, but only if enough shares are auctioned to the highest bidder.
That seems unlikely on the international stage, where nations can be
expected to jealously guard the interests of their industry. Catch shares also
241.
Benjamin Galuardi et al., Complex Migration Routes of Atlantic Bluefin Tuna (Thunnus
thynnus) Question Current Population Structure Paradigm, 67 CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC
SCI. 966 (2010).
242.
Eric L. Gilman, Bycatch Governance and Best Practice Mitigation Technology in Global
Tuna Fisheries, 35 MARINE POL’Y 590, 591–93 (2011).
243.
David Jolly, Industry Flouts Bluefin Catch Limits, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES GREEN
(Oct. 18, 2011), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/industry-flouts-bluefin-catchlimits-study-says/.
244.
Id.
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should put share holders on the side of better regulation, because illegal
catch drives down the value of their shares. That assumes, however, that the
share holders or their governments can take effective enforcement steps. In
a far-flung deepwater fishery involving disparate participants, share holders
themselves can do little to stop IUU fishing. Under current law, individual
nations (outside their own EEZs) and the RFMOs also have only limited
authority. International catch shares are not the answer to the enforcement
problem. They are just as dependent on improved enforcement will and
capacity as conventional management.

CONCLUSION
To date, most of the enthusiasm for catch share strategies comes from
economists. There may be particular reasons for skepticism when economists promote property rights approaches. Their disciplinary training and
orientation tends to make them see efficiency as an especially important
goal and markets as a particularly useful tool for achieving that goal.245
Looked at from a broader perspective, catch shares, like other policy
prescriptions, are tools that are right for some jobs but not others. Their
usefulness for management of any fishery cannot be answered in isolation.
The answer is not uniformly yes or no; the correct answer is “it depends on
the context.” Before a property rights approach (or any other broad policy
strategy) is adopted, it should be evaluated in context from a variety of
disciplinary perspectives. After implementation, evaluation should continue.
The first step in deciding whether catch shares have a role to play in
the management of a specific fishery is identification of management goals,
and prioritization among goals that are or may be in tension. The next step
is to compare the goals to what catch shares can do, identifying the benefits
they are intended to provide and any costs they may impose. A property
rights-based approach is most likely to be helpful if reducing industry
inefficiency is a high priority goal. But reducing inefficiency often has
distributional costs; in deciding whether to use a property rights approach
and if so how to bound trading, the relevant policymakers must decide
whether or not efficiency gains outweigh distributional costs.
Other conclusions about the efficacy of catch shares are more difficult
to draw with confidence, at least at the broadest scale. There is some
evidence that introduction of catch shares may have positive effects on
245.
This is not a swipe at economists. Every discipline has its ingrained professional
biases, and every discipline is likely to systematically overvalue its own tools. As a lawyer, I
have no difficulty acknowledging that lawyers may be overly sensitive to distributional
equity and undoubtedly systematically overvalue litigation as a tool for achieving policy
outcomes.
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stewardship of target species, but so far that evidence is more of correlation
than of causation. There are sound theoretical reasons to believe that catch
shares can encourage stewardship behavior, provided that the economics of
the fishery are right. So far there is very little evidence about the impact of
catch shares on ecosystems and non-target species, but again theory suggests
that impact is likely to be context-specific. If the ecological problems result
from the need of financially strapped fishers to cut costs or from the frenzy
of a short-term derby fishery, catch shares should help. If they come from
other sources, however, such as a close association between target and nontarget species or the gear used in the fishery, catch shares alone will do little
to help. There is both theoretical and empirical reason to believe that catch
shares can reduce resistance to lowered TACs, and perhaps to other conservation measures. Again, this effect is a function of the economics of the
particular fishery. It will occur if, but only if, fishery participants have a
sufficiently long time horizon, view their property interest as secure for the
relevant time, and believe that conservation measures are necessary for
sustainable exploitation of their target species. The shift to a catch share
strategy will increase conflict over allocation of rights, and will not reduce
value conflicts over the ethical acceptability of resource exploitation.
In no case is specification of property rights a complete substitute for
fishery regulation. Total allowable catches must still be determined, and
gear limits and seasonal restrictions may still be necessary for sustainable
harvest and to protect non-target species. Enforcement of these restrictions
will remain a challenge, particularly in far-flung fisheries with many available
landing sites and direct retail marketing opportunities. Catch shares
themselves introduce the need for another layer of administration and
enforcement, tracking share ownership and ensuring that it matches catch
or landings.
None of this is to say that catch shares are not a useful fishery
management approach. Although more empirical study of their impacts is
needed, it seems clear that catch shares can provide a path to reduced capacity
and increased long-term sustainability of target species harvest in many
domestic fisheries in developed nations. Where these are the key management
goals, catch shares will often be the preferred strategy.
That preference should not be automatically imported to the trans- or
inter-national context. Value conflicts, which may not be readily apparent
on the surface, may mean that nations that share an interest in a stock have
irreconcilable management goals. Catch shares will not solve those conflicts,
and may even make them more intractable. Even if their goals coincide,
nations and individuals engaged in international fisheries may deeply
mistrust one another’s motives, or the motives or interpretations of the
management entity. That sort of mistrust may make it impossible to agree
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on the nature of “the fisheries problem,” or on essential details such as the
appropriate allocation of rights among nations or extent of restrictions on
transfer. Finally, enforcement is a special challenge in the international
fishery context. Lack of capacity for and commitment to enforcement will
exacerbate the trust issues between participants.
Property rights approaches to resource management problems seem to
be on the rise globally, and have become especially dominant in domestic
fisheries. They have understandable appeal in the high seas context, in light
of concerns about rapidly declining global fisheries. They are not, however,
the right tool for addressing the current woes of the world’s oceans. Their
implementation would face high practical and political barriers, without
promising concomitantly high conservation benefits. Only after clarifying
joint goals and overcoming the enforcement challenges should the international fishery community worry about how to introduce catch share
management strategies.

